In this study, we provide evidence on the pricing of other comprehensive income (OCI) that differs from most evidence in prior research. Prior archival research has largely concluded that OCI is not priced by investors. In contrast, we provide evidence in the post-SFAS 130 period that OCI is priced on a dollar-fordollar basis as is predicted by economic theory for transitory income items. We attribute this finding to our use of post-SFAS 130 as-reported measures of OCI rather than pre-SFAS 130 as-if estimates of OCI measures. Furthermore, we document that two components of OCI, foreign currency translation adjustment and unrealized gains/losses on available-for-sale securities, are priced by investors. In the post-SFAS 130 period, we also find that the type of financial statement in which The views expressed in this article are that of Tom Linsmeier (and his co-authors) and do not present positions of the Financial Accounting Standards Board. Positions of the Financial Accounting Standards Board are arrived at only after extensive due process and deliberations. firms report OCI and its components affects pricing, consistent with the conclusions of prior experimental research. However, our evidence suggests that investors pay greater attention to OCI information reported in the statement of changes in equity, rather than in a statement of financial performance. This could be attributed to investors becoming more familiar in the post-SFAS 130 period with the predominant reporting of OCI and its components in the statement of changes in equity. These findings may be relevant to both the Financial Accounting Standards Board and the International Accounting Standards Board, which jointly are undertaking a new project that, in part, is addressing financial statement presentation of OCI items.

We examine the stock price reaction to management's disclosure of internal control weaknesses under §302 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act and to the characteristics of these weaknesses, controlling for other material announcements in the event window. We find that some characteristics of the weaknesses-their severity, management's conclusion regarding the effectiveness of the controls, their auditability, and the vagueness of the disclosures-are informative. We also find that the information content of internal control weakness disclosures depends on the severity of the internal control weakness. Moreover, in a sub-sample uncontaminated by other announcements in the event window, we find negative price reactions to the disclosure of internal control weaknesses and material weaknesses.

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