No abstract

The traditional philosophical doctrines of Consequentialism, Doing and Allowing, and Double Effect prescribe that moral judgments and decisions should be based on consequences, action (as opposed to inaction), and intention. This study uses functional magnetic resonance imaging to investigate how these three factors affect brain processes associated with moral judgments. We find the following: (1) Moral scenarios involving only a choice between consequences with different amounts of harm elicit activity in similar areas of the brain as analogous non-moral scenarios; (2) Compared to analogous non-moral scenarios, moral scenarios in which action and inaction result in the same amount of harm elicit more activity in areas associated with cognition (such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) and less activity in areas associated with emotion (such as the orbitofrontal cortex and temporal pole); (3) Compared to analogous non-moral scenarios, conflicts between goals of minimizing harm and of refraining from harmful action elicit more activity in areas associated with emotion (orbitofrontal cortex and temporal pole) and less activity in areas associated with cognition (including the angular gyrus and superior frontal gyrus); (4) Compared to moral scenarios involving only unintentional harm, moral scenarios involving intentional harm elicit more activity in areas associated with emotion (orbitofrontal cortex and temporal pole) and less activity in areas associated with cognition (including the angular gyrus and superior frontal gyrus). These findings suggest that different kinds of moral judgment are preferentially supported by distinguishable brain systems.

Cue control in spatial learning was investigated in a plus maze and a Morris maze. Rats transported in opaque containers with prior rotation to a plus maze, but not a Morris maze, could not find a goal defined by external cues. Rats transported in clear containers without rotation found the goal in both mazes. In the Morris maze, goal location was readily relearned following cue removal by rats in clear containers but not by rats in the opaque/rotation group. B. L. McNaughton et al.'s (1996) theory that during spatial learning sensory information is bound to preconfigured internal maps in the hippocampus, whose metric is self-motion and whose orientation depends on input from an inertial based head direction system, may explain this study's findings.

Chronic social/emotional deficits are common in moderate to severe traumatic brain injury (TBI), leading to significant functional difficulties. Objective, quantitative tools for assessing social/emotional competence are an important adjunct to cognitive assessments. We review existing social/emotional measures, conclude that theory of mind tests are not adequate for clinical assessments of social competence, and explain the development and piloting of novel measures in a small group of moderate to severe TBI patients (N = 16) and non-brain-damaged controls (N = 16). The novel measures are the Global Interpersonal Skills Test (GIST), a questionnaire measuring informant-rated social skills; the Assessment of Social Context (ASC), a video-based task examining understanding of others' emotions, attitudes, and intentions; the Social Interpretations Test, a social framing task based on Heider and Simmel ( 1944 ); and Awareness of Interoception, a heartbeat-detection paradigm related to physiological self-awareness. In a MANOVA, other-rated social skills (GIST), ASC, and Awareness of Interoception scores were significantly lower for TBI patients than controls. ASC, r(31) = .655, and Social Interpretations, r(31) = .460, scores were significantly correlated with informant-rated social skills (GIST). We encourage clinicians to add social/emotional measures to assessments of TBI patients.