Data are reported from 3,213 research eyewitnesses confirming that accurate eyewitness identifications from lineups are made faster than are inaccurate identifications. However, consistent with predictions from the recognition and search literatures, the authors did not find support for the "10-12-s rule" in which lineup identifications faster than 10-12 s maximally discriminate between accurate and inaccurate identifications (D. Dunning & S. Perretta, 2002). Instead, the time frame that proved most discriminating was highly variable across experiments, ranging from 5 s to 29 s, and the maximally discriminating time was often unimpressive in its ability to sort accurate from inaccurate identifications. The authors suggest several factors that are likely to moderate the 10-12-s rule.

Estimator variables are factors that can affect the accuracy of eyewitness identifications but that are outside of the control of the criminal justice system. Examples include (1) the duration of exposure to the perpetrator, (2) the passage of time between the crime and the identification (retention interval), (3) the distance between the witness and the perpetrator at the time of the crime. Suboptimal estimator variables (e.g., long distance) have long been thought to reduce the reliability of eyewitness identifications (IDs), but recent evidence suggests that this is not true of IDs made with high confidence and may or may not be true of IDs made with lower confidence. The evidence suggests that though suboptimal estimator variables decrease discriminability (i.e., the ability to distinguish innocent from guilty suspects), they do not decrease the reliability of IDs made with high confidence. Such findings are inconsistent with the longstanding "optimality hypothesis" and therefore require a new theoretical framework. Here, we propose that a signal-detection-based likelihood ratio account-which has long been a mainstay of basic theories of recognition memory-naturally accounts for these findings.

Two experiments investigated new dimensions of the effect of confirming feedback on eyewitness identification confidence using target-absent and target-present lineups and (previously unused) unbiased witness instructions (i.e., "offender not present" option highlighted). In Experiment 1, participants viewed a crime video and were later asked to try to identify the thief from an 8-person target-absent photo array. Feedback inflated witness confidence for both mistaken identifications and correct lineup rejections. With target-present lineups in Experiment 2, feedback inflated confidence for correct and mistaken identifications and lineup rejections. Although feedback had no influence on the confidence-accuracy correlation, it produced clear overconfidence. Confidence inflation varied with the confidence measure reference point (i.e., retrospective vs. current confidence) and identification response latency.

This study explored the influence of mood and emotion on mock-jurors' processing of testimonial inconsistencies, perceptions of witness credibility and offender culpability, and verdicts. Jurors' mood and testimonial consistency were manipulated using a simulated trial with a 2 (mood: sad/neutral) x 2 (testimonial consistency: consistent/inconsistent) between-groups design. Sad mood resulted in more accurate reporting of testimonial inconsistencies, a finding consistent with previous research indicating more substantive processing in association with sad mood. Direct relationships between veridicality and number of inconsistencies detected and mock-juror judgments were also observed. Although anger was not experimentally manipulated, the data suggest that trial circumstances which arouse anger in jurors may impair processing and also bias their judgments of witnesses and defendants. Possible directions for research on mood and emotion in the courtroom context are suggested.

Witnesses observe crimes at various distances and the courts have to interpret their testimony given the likely quality of witnesses' views of events. We examined how accurately witnesses judged the distance between themselves and a target person, and how distance affected description accuracy, choosing behavior, and identification test accuracy. Over 1,300 participants were approached during normal daily activities, and asked to observe a target person at one of a number of possible distances. Under a Perception, Immediate Memory, or Delayed Memory condition, witnesses provided a brief description of the target, estimated the distance to the target, and then examined a 6-person target-present or target-absent lineup to see if they could identify the target. Errors in distance judgments were often substantial. Description accuracy was mediocre and did not vary systematically with distance. Identification choosing rates were not affected by distance, but decision accuracy declined with distance. Contrary to previous research, a 15-m viewing distance was not critical for discriminating accurate from inaccurate decisions.