Forensic DNA profiling and databasing have become increasingly significant resources for criminal investigations in many jurisdictions. More recently, there have been attempts to recruit these technologies into the policing of cross-border organized crime, migration and terrorism. We examined the trajectory of one such attempt, the establishment and operationalisation of the Prüm Treaty within the European Union. We describe the way in which early technological considerations underlying DNA profile exchange, managed within law enforcement bureaucracies, have given way to a concern with broader societal issues and the necessity for a multifaceted scrutiny of this particular technolegal innovation. Central to this issue is the hybrid nature of exchange arrangements created as a result of the European Council Decision on Prüm (2008). The Prüm Treaty departs from the increasingly normalized framework for criminal justice cooperation, and at the same time, does not facilitate DNA exchange within a more traditional multinational instrument. We consider the significance and implications of the political decisions behind Prüm, as well as the consequences for the development of transnational DNA exchange in terms of three key issues: technical and scientific challenges (viability); legal challenges (legitimacy); and ethical and socioeconomic challenges (acceptability). Unless the Prüm structure is reformed, an important and promising initiative may remain encumbered with unresolved problems of legitimacy and acceptability. A lack of direct democratic involvement of many member states precluded the creation of consensus on issues such as privacy, data protection and due process issues, upon which legal and political regimes could then act.

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Abstract. The impact of lead shot on soils and crops was examined at a clay pigeon shooting site in northern England. Topsoil cores were collected along a 300 m transect from the shooting range, and the numbers of lead shot pellets per soil core, total and ‘plant‐available’(0.5m acetic acid extractable) lead concentrations, organic matter content, pH and cation exchange capacity were determined. The number of oilseed rape plants and their stem diameters were recorded in 1 m2 quadrats placed at the soil sampling locations. Total and ‘plant‐available’ lead concentrations in the soil were most but plant numbers per m2 and mean stem diameters were least in the area of greatest lead shot deposition. Total lead concentrations in the soil commonly exceeded 5000 mg/kg; these are considerably greater than threshold ‘trigger’ concentrations proposed by the Department of the Environment, above which soils are considered to be contaminated and warrant further investigation. Concentrations of lead in the oilseed rape plants themselves were also largest in the area of most intense lead shot deposition; in root samples the lead concentration exceeded 400 mg/kg. The management and remediation of contaminated soils at the clay pigeon shooting site are discussed.

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In 2008, the European Court of Human Rights, in S and Marper v the United Kingdom, ruled that a retention regime that permits the indefinite retention of DNA records of both convicted and non-convicted ("innocent") individuals is disproportionate. The court noted that there was inadequate evidence to justify the retention of DNA records of the innocent. Since the Marper ruling, the laws governing the taking, use, and retention of forensic DNA in England and Wales have changed with the enactment of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA). This Act, put briefly, permits the indefinite retention of DNA profiles of most convicted individuals and temporal retention for some first-time convicted minors and innocent individuals on the National DNA Database (NDNAD). The PoFA regime was implemented in October 2013. This paper examines ten post-implementation reports of the NDNAD Strategy Board (3), the NDNAD Ethics Group (3) and the Office of the Biometrics Commissioner (OBC) (4). Overall, the reports highlight a considerable improvement in the performance of the database, with a current match rate of 63.3%. Further, the new regime has strengthened the genetic privacy protection of UK citizens. The OBC reports detail implementation challenges ranging from technical, legal and procedural issues to sufficient understanding of the requirements of PoFA by police forces. Risks highlighted in these reports include the deletion of some "retainable" profiles, which could potentially lead to future crimes going undetected. A further risk is the illegal retention of some profiles from innocent individuals, which may lead to privacy issues and legal challenges. In conclusion, the PoFA regime appears to be working well, however, critical research is still needed to evaluate its overall efficacy compared to other retention regimes.