How accurate are insights compared to analytical solutions? In four experiments, we investigated how participants’ solving strategies influenced their solution accuracies across different types of problems, including one that was linguistic, one that was visual and two that were mixed visual-linguistic. In each experiment, participants’ self-judged insight solutions were, on average, more accurate than their analytic ones. We hypothesised that insight solutions have superior accuracy because they emerge into consciousness in an all-or-nothing fashion when the unconscious solving process is complete, whereas analytic solutions can be guesses based on conscious, prematurely terminated, processing. This hypothesis is supported by the finding that participants’ analytic solutions included relatively more incorrect responses (i.e., errors of commission) than timeouts (i.e., errors of omission) compared to their insight responses.

Creative ideas seem often to appear when we close our eyes, stare at a blank wall, or gaze out of a window-all signs of shutting out distractions and turning attention inward. Prior research has demonstrated that attention-related brain areas are differently active when people solve problems with sudden insight (the Aha! phenomenon), relative to deliberate, analytic solving. We directly investigated the relationship between attention deployment and problem solving by recording eye movements and blinks, which are overt indicators of attention, as people solved short, visually presented problems. In the preparation period, before problems eventually solved by insight, participants blinked more frequently and longer, and made fewer fixations, than before problems eventually solved by analysis. Immediately prior to solutions, participants blinked longer and looked away from the problem more often when solving by insight than when solving analytically. These phenomena extend prior research with a direct demonstration of dynamic differences in attention as people solve problems with sudden insight versus analytically.

Rebus puzzles and compound remote associate problems have been successfully used to study problem solving. These problems are physically compact, often can be solved within short time limits, and have unambiguous solutions, and English versions have been normed for solving rates and levels of difficulty. Many studies on problem solving with sudden insight have taken advantage of these features in paradigms that require many quick solutions (e.g., solution priming, visual hemifield presentations, electroencephalography, fMRI, and eyetracking). In order to promote this vein of research in Italy, as well, we created and tested Italian versions of both of these tests. The data collected across three studies yielded a pool of 88 rebus puzzles and 122 compound remote associate problems within a moderate range of difficulty. This article provides both sets of problems with their normative data, for use in future research.

Having a sudden insight is often associated with inherent confidence, enough for Archimedes to run naked through the streets shouting “Eureka!”. Recent evidence demonstrates that public displays of enthusiasm, such as the ancient polymath's, are actually supported by a higher likelihood of being correct.

According to the Gestalt theorists, restructuring is an essential component of insight problem-solving, contributes to the “Aha!” experience, and is similar to the perceptual switch experienced when reinterpreting ambiguous figures. Previous research has demonstrated that pupil diameter increases during the perceptual switch of ambiguous figures, and indexes norepeinephrine functioning mediated by the locus coeruleus. In this study, we investigated if pupil diameter similarly predicts the switch into awareness people experience when solving a problem via insight. Additionally, we explored eye movement dynamics during the same task to investigate if the problem-solving strategies used are linked to specific oculomotor behaviors. In 38 participants, pupil diameter increased about 500 msec prior to solution only in trials for which subjects report having an insight. In contrast, participants increased their microsaccade rate only prior to non-insight solutions. Pupil dilation and microsaccades were not reliably related, but both appear to be robust markers of how people solve problems (with or without insight). The pupil size change seen when people have an “Aha!” moment represents an indicator of the switch into awareness of unconscious processes humans depend upon for insight, and suggests important involvement of norepinephrine, via the locus coeruleus, in sudden insight.

‘Emotional intelligence’ (EI) is one of the most highly used psychological terms in popular nomenclature, yet its construct, divergent, and predictive validities are contentiously debated. Despite this debate, the EI construct is composed of a set of emotional abilities – recognizing emotional states in the self and others, using emotions to guide thought and behavior, understanding how emotions shape behavior, and emotion regulation – that undoubtedly influence important social and personal outcomes. In this review, evidence from human lesion studies is reviewed in order to provide insight into the necessary brain regions for each of these core emotional abilities. Critically, we consider how this neuropsychological evidence might help to guide efforts to define and measure EI.

The solution to a problem might manifest itself as a burst of unexpected, unpredictable clarity. Such Eureka! events, or Insight moments, are among the most fascinating mysteries of human cognition, whose neurophysiological substrate seems to include a role for oscillatory activity within the α and γ bands in the right parietal and temporal brain regions. We tested this hypothesis on thirty-one healthy participants using transcranial Alternating Current Stimulation (tACS) to externally amplify α (10 Hz) and γ (40 Hz) activity in the right parietal and temporal lobes, respectively. During γ-tACS over the right temporal lobe, we observed an increase in accuracy on a verbal insight task. Furthermore, electroencephalography (EEG) data revealed an increase in γ spectral power over bilateral temporal lobes after stimulation. Additionally, resting-state functional MRI data acquired before the stimulation session suggested a correlation between behavioral response to right temporal lobe tACS and functional connectivity of bilateral temporal lobes, in line with the bilateral increase in γ band revealed by EEG. Overall, results suggest the possibility of enhancing the probability of generating Eureka! moments in humans by means of frequency-specific noninvasive brain stimulation.

In times of uncertainty, people often seek out information to help alleviate fear, possibly leaving them vulnerable to false information. During the COVID-19 pandemic, we attended to a viral spread of incorrect and misleading information that compromised collective actions and public health measures to contain the spread of the disease. We investigated the influence of fear of COVID-19 on social and cognitive factors including believing in fake news, bullshit receptivity, overclaiming, and problem-solving—within two of the populations that have been severely hit by COVID-19: Italy and the United States of America. To gain a better understanding of the role of misinformation during the early height of the COVID-19 pandemic, we also investigated whether problem-solving ability and socio-cognitive polarization were associated with believing in fake news. Results showed that fear of COVID-19 is related to seeking out information about the virus and avoiding infection in the Italian and American samples, as well as a willingness to share real news (COVID and non-COVID-related) headlines in the American sample. However, fear positively correlated with bullshit receptivity, suggesting that the pandemic might have contributed to creating a situation where people were pushed toward pseudo-profound existential beliefs. Furthermore, problem-solving ability was associated with correctly discerning real or fake news, whereas socio-cognitive polarization was the strongest predictor of believing in fake news in both samples. From these results, we concluded that a construct reflecting cognitive rigidity, neglecting alternative information, and black-and-white thinking negatively predicts the ability to discern fake from real news. Such a construct extends also to reasoning processes based on thinking outside the box and considering alternative information such as problem-solving.