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A broad array of domestic institutional factors-including problems with the originate-todistribute model for mortgage loans, deteriorating lending standards, deficiencies in risk management, conflicting incentives for the GSEs, and shortcomings of supervision and regulation-were the primary sources of the U.S. housing boom and bust and the associated financial crisis. In addition, the extended rise in U.S. house prices was likely also supported by long-term interest rates (including mortgage rates) that were surprisingly low, given the level of short-term rates and other macro fundamentals-a development that Greenspan (2005) dubbed a "conundrum." The "global saving glut" (GSG) hypothesis (Bernanke, 2005 and 2007) argues that increased capital inflows to the United States from countries in which desired saving greatly exceeded desired investment-including Asian emerging markets and commodity exporterswere an important reason that U.S. longer-term interest rates during this period were lower than expected. This essay investigates further the effects of capital inflows to the United States on U.S. longer-term interest rates; however, we look beyond the overall size of the inflows emphasized by the GSG hypothesis to examine the implications for U.S. yields of the portfolio preferences of foreign creditors. We present evidence that, in the spirit of Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2009), foreign investors during this period tended to prefer U.S. assets perceived to be safe. In particular, foreign investors-especially the GSG countries-acquired a substantial share of the new issues of U.S. Treasuries, Agency debt, and Agency-sponsored mortgage-backed securities. The downward pressure on yields exerted by inflows from the GSG countries was reinforced by the portfolio preferences of other foreign investors. We focus particularly on the case of Europe: Although Europe did not run a large current account surplus as did the GSG countries, we show that it leveraged up its international balance sheet, issuing external liabilities to finance substantial purchases of apparently safe U.S. "private-label" mortgage-backed securities and other fixed-income products. The strong demand for apparently safe assets by both domestic and foreign investors not only served to reduce yields on these assets but also provided additional incentives for the U.S. financial services industry to develop structured investment products that "transformed" risky loans into highly-rated securities. Our findings do not challenge the view that domestic factors, including those listed above, were the primary sources of the housing boom and bust in the United States. However, examining how changes in the pattern of international capital flows affected yields on U.S. assets helps provide a deeper understanding of the origins and dynamics of the crisis.

Most households persistently invest in riskless assets but not stocks, and may do so because they perceive the information required for market participation to be costly relative to expected benefits. In a CCAPM, increased risk aversion, income risk, and lower resources reduce the information expense sufficient todeter stockholding. Bivariate probit analysis using the 1983-89 Survey of Consumer Finances shows that households with lower risk aversion, higher education, and greater wealth who were nonstockholders in 1983 had an increased conditional probability of entering by 1989, while 1983 stockholders with lower resources, more limited education, and greater risk aversion were more likely to be nonstockholders by 1989.

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This paper reports monthly estimates of U.S. cross-border securities positions obtained by combining the (now) annual TIC surveys with monthly transactions data adjusted for various differences in the two reporting standards. Our approach is similar to that of Thomas, Warnock and Wongswan (2004), but in addition to having a somewhat larger dataset we are able to make some simplifications to the numerical procedure used and we incorporate additional adjustments to the transactions data. This paper describes the procedure used and presents the monthly results. In addition, we discuss how the procedure can be extended to extrapolate holdings estimates beyond the most recent survey values. We focus primarily on U.S. liabilities to foreign holders, because more data is available than for U.S. claims, but we show how our methodology can be applied to U.S. claims as well. We also provide some guidance on how the changes in estimated holdings can be decomposed into flows, valuation changes, and other factors. Time series of estimates of holdings, by country, are available for download.

, and conference participants at the Federal Reserve, Bank of Canada, and NBER for helpful comments. James Coonan and Corinne Land provided superb research assistance. NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peerreviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications.

Although most recent empirical research regarding the size and significance of the impact of changes in wealth on consumption has looked for such effects in the United States, equity prices in the 1990s rose considerably in most other industrial countries as well. This paper investigates the strength of the wealth effect across countries. Using a variety of methods, I find evidence of significant wealth effects in the United Kingdom and Canada of a size comparable to that in the United States, reflecting the importance of equities in aggregate household wealth in these countries. A significant wealth effect is also evident in Japan, but because household wealth has changed little on balance in Japan in recent years, this channel has been less important in explaining Japanese consumption growth in the second half of the 1990s. Despite a rapid appreciation in equity prices and an increase in equity ownership in the major continental European countries since 1995, equities remain a less important form of household wealth in most of these countries, and the consumption response to changes in wealth remains limited. However, in some smaller European countries where equity issuance is more common, the emerging evidence suggests that wealth effects may be more important.