The empirical evidence indicates that ethnic autonomy arrangements (EAAs) survive more often than not, but this mixed track record raises an important question. What accounts for the survival of some systems and not others? We theorize that that this differential survival rate is partly a function of variation in their internal structure. EAAs that are structured to create and best sustain an equilibrium in bargaining relations between center d periphery have the highest probability of survival. It follows logically that the more unbalanced the system in favor of either the center or periphery, the less likely to survive. We test the theory using logit analysis on an original data set drawn from the universe of post-1945 EAAs. After controlling for level of democracy and wealth disparity, the key finding is that the internal structure of an EAA matters for its survival. One important implication of these findings is that, for any given level of democracy, ethnofederal systems can be systematically designed to maximize survival prospects

Las transferencias monetarias condicionadas son una política popular de alivio de la pobreza en todo el mundo. Sus efectos de alto impacto atraen la atención de los políticos, que pueden manipular estos programas para obtener votos. Este artículo analiza cómo la distribución espacial de los perfiles de votantes afecta la distribución de beneficios. La teoría aquí presentada sugiere que los espacios con mayor homogeneidad de tipos de votantes reciben menos beneficios que sus contrapartes más heterogéneas, lo que a su vez crea un incentivo de redistribución conflictivo—las mismas características que se asocian con mayores participaciones de beneficios también pueden comprometerlos, según su posición dentro del espacio objetivo. Esta expectativa se basa en la confianza de un político en los efectos multiplicativos; los beneficios crean un efecto dominó de otros tipos de beneficios que también generan votos, que los políticos pueden tener en cuenta. El estudio del caso de Bolsa Familia de Brasil, el programa de transferencias monetarias condicionadas más grande del mundo, proporciona pruebas sólidas para respaldar las hipótesis.

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This article theorizes the strategies used by parties to expand their support base, with a particular focus on the allocation of party goods. Here, we theorize that nascent parties with goods to hand out will favour a particular type of societal group, which we name private-gain-seeking groups. We utilize Peru’s party system collapse following Fujimori’s rule as an opportunity to test our hypotheses, which state that political parties will favour electorally volatile groups with restricted access to information or compromised opportunities to process it. Evidence for the hypotheses is found using data on the FONCODES allocation patterns of approximately 750 mayoral districts in Peru. The data suggest that groups expected to be favoured could end up receiving shares 34 percent greater than the least attractive groups.

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