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This study follows recent research on criminal earnings and examines the impact of underlying traits (low self‐control) and personal organization features (nonredundant networking) on the criminal earnings of a sample of incarcerated offenders previously involved in market and predatory crimes. Controlling for various background factors (age, noncriminal income, lambda and costs of doing crime), both low self‐control and nonredundant networking independently explain why some offenders are more successful than others in achieving higher monetary standards through crime. Although efficient, brokerage‐like networking enhances market offenders' earnings, low self‐control emerges as an asset for predatory offenders: the lower their self‐control, the higher their criminal earnings. For market offenders, however, low self‐control has no direct effect, but it does mitigate the impact of effective networking on criminal earnings. The results emerging from this study have implications for Gottfredson and Hirschi's theory of crime and the advent of a criminal network perspective. Extensions are also made toward the conventional/criminal embeddedness framework and deterrence research.

Brokers are fundamental for maintaining flexibility in the networks that embed criminal activities. Our study aims at offering more precision on this key issue by examining the impact that brokers may have on crime‐commission processes. To do so, we analyze two stolen‐vehicle exportation (or ringing) operations within a framework that merges crime‐script analysis and social‐network analysis. We assess how diverse degrees of brokerage are distributed across the ringing operations and how the removal of key brokers would have had a disruptive impact by reducing the scope of alternatives for crime‐script permutation and flexibility.

Even though intense cultural pressures for monetary success and an institutional social structure dominated by the economy are viewed in anomie theory as stimulating criminal motivations and accounting for criminal behavior with an instrumental character, patterns in criminal earnings have not attracted much scholarly and empirical attention. Wilson and Abrahamse's (1992) analysis of Rand's second inmate survey concluded that most inmates interviewed during the survey had overestimated their monthly criminal earnings in an effort to rationalize their poor criminal performances. In this paper, we conduct, using Rand's first survey, a reanalysis of inmates' self‐reported monthly earnings. We conclude that meaningful patterns in criminal achievements easily emerge when allowed to do so. These patterns offer a telling story about differential criminal opportunities. Wilson and Abrahamse's emphasis on temporal inconsistency and response bias (boosting past benefits of crime) misrepresents the facts of that story and misjudges those persons agreeing to tell it. It is concluded that for a “criminal subculture” to have any persuasive or binding effect, its participants must be reasonably assured that their chances of making “crime pay” are not so remote as to become unattainable.

Much of the research focusing on conventional occupations concludes that mentored individuals are more successful in their careers than those who are not mentored. Early research in criminology made a similar claim. Yet contemporary criminology has all but ignored mentors. We investigate this oversight, drawing on Sutherland's insights on tutelage and criminal maturation and incorporating ideas on human and social capital. We argue that mentors play a key role in their protégés' criminal achievements and examine this hypothesis with data from a recent survey of incarcerated adult male offenders in the Canadian province of Quebec. In this sample, a substantial proportion of respondents reported the presence of an influential individual in their lives who introduced them to a criminal milieu and whom they explicitly regarded as a mentor. After studying the attributes of offenders and their mentors, we develop a causal framework that positions criminal mentor presence within a pathway that leads to greater benefits and lower costs from crime.

This study focuses on individual positioning within an illegal drug distribution network surrounding a reputed criminal organization (the Quebec Hells Angels). The aim is to distinguish between participants who were positioned vulnerably and/or strategically during a period when the network was targeted by an intensive law-enforcement investigation. Two centrality measures are used throughout the analysis. Degree centrality accounts for the number of direct contacts surrounding a participant. Betweenness centrality accounts for a participant’s brokerage leverage by measuring the scope of indirect relationships that s/he mediates. The final results reveal how differential positions in the network influence the judicial outcomes (arrests) within the case. Participants with high degree centrality were more likely to be arrested. Participants with high betweenness centrality were less likely to be arrested. Most importantly for law-enforcement concerns, those participants with high brokerage level were less likely to be members of the Hells Angels, thus suggesting that targeting strategies must take consider the patterns that represent an offender’s network at any given time, rather than simply focusing on an offender’s status and reputation within a criminal organization.

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