This article provides a critical, empirically based analysis of the multiple ways in which diaspora communities participate in transnational politics related to their war‐affected former home countries. The case of Sri Lanka — and the Tamil and Sinhalese diasporas in the West — is used to illustrate how contemporary armed conflicts are increasingly waged in an international arena. Active diaspora groups have enabled an extension of nationalist mobilization, hostilities and polarization across the globe. Diaspora actors take part in propaganda work and fundraising in support of the belligerent parties in Sri Lanka, while the polarization between Sinhalese and Tamils is to a large extent replicated in the diaspora. However, there are also examples of diaspora groups that challenge war and militarism, for instance by calling for non‐violent conflict resolution, condemning atrocities by both sides, and engaging in cross‐ethnic dialogue. The article also argues that diaspora engagement in reconstruction of war‐torn areas can be a double‐edged sword, as it can reproduce — or reduce — grievances and inequalities that fuel the conflict. By discussing the many ways in which diasporas engage in homeland politics, the article challenges simplified understandings of diasporas as either‘warriors’or‘peace workers’ in relation to their homeland conflicts.

This article deals with civil society in the ethnically polarized violent conflict of Sri Lanka. It spells out the possible role of civil society in peacebuilding, while at the same time problematizing the civil-society concept and pointing to the problems faced by civil society in Sri Lanka in taking on this role. Civil-society actors in Sri Lanka strive to contribute to peace processes (1) addressing ethnic divides and public opinion with education and awareness-raising programmes, as well as cross-ethnic dialogue, (2) addressing politics with popular mobilization, advocacy work, and informal diplomacy, and (3) addressing economic issues through reconstruction and development. However, civil society in Sri Lanka has been weakened by political patronage and the protracted war. Like Sri Lankan society, it is to a large extent ethnically divided, and popular mobilization has through history been nationalist and violent rather than pro-peace. Although civic peace organizations work hard to take on a peacebuilding role, their activities are often project-oriented and top-down, rather than mass-based and bottom-up. Moreover, critical assessments of the impact of small-scale activities and analysis of the linkage between them and the larger conflict context (in which the work of similar organizations as well as external forces have to be taken into account) need to be further developed, by civil-society actors as well as researchers.

This article investigates how the global dominance of the transitional justice (TJ) discourse and practiceand the controversies and conflicts that arise around TJhave come to make up an important context for diaspora mobilisation. The article looks at the increasingly globalised mechanisms and norms of transitional justice as a set of opportunity structurespolitical, legal and discursivewhich shape diaspora mobilisation. Diaspora engagement in commemoration, truth-seeking and legal justice in relation to atrocities in Rwanda and Sri Lanka is studied. The article shows that in relation to Rwanda, state dominance and divides are largely replicated in the diasporic space, while the Sri Lankan case provides examples of how Tamil diaspora engagement have been able to reverse power dynamics around TJ. Combining opportunity structures with the concept of 'past presencing', the article shows how diaspora groups appropriate and strategise in relation to the dominant norms and practices of TJ, and how in doing so the past is performed and experienced in ways which are both personally and politically meaningful.

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How can a relapse into violent conflict be prevented in Sri Lanka? This article examines how the case of Sri Lanka effectively exposes the limitations of the international discourse and practice of conflict prevention. Conflict prevention in Sri Lanka has to take place within a global and domestic context which is largely unaccounted for in the conflict-prevention literature and policy discourse. Changes in the international power balance over the last decade have decreased the room of manoeuvre for actors such as the United States and European Union while giving Asian powers such as Chinawith a different approach to conflict prevention-more influence over domestic policies in countries like Sri Lanka. Moreover, the conflict prevention discourse and 'tools' tend to assume a negotiated peace agreement where the conflict parties have an interest in preventing conflicts rather than merely suppressing them. The significant power asymmetry between the winning and the losing sides in the Sri Lankan conflict, coupled with the lack of power or interest of international actors to influence Sri Lanka's domestic affairs-have rendered 'conflict prevention' a tool for continued domination and containment of conflicts. The article further highlights the risks that conflictprevention measures may exacerbate conflict or undermine other conflict-prevention measures. A number of challenges for conflict prevention-in the areas of (1) demilitarisation/militarisation, (2) political power sharing, (3) justice and reconciliation, and (4) postwar reconstruction and economic development-are addressed.