Intellectual humility, a recognition of the fallibility of one's own views and an openness to changing those views when warranted, is a construct with roots in philosophy that is only now beginning to receive attention from psychological scientists. We focus on intellectual humility in the domain of religious belief and conduct an initial test of the hypothesis that the influence of religious beliefs on evaluations of written opinions about religious matters is moderated by intellectual humility. We find that our ad hoc measure of intellectual humility in the religious domain is best characterized in terms of four correlated dimensions, allowing for focused tests of our hypothesis. We find some support for the hypothesis. Individuals with strong religious beliefs who are low in intellectual humility in the religion domain, regardless of dimension, react more strongly than their high humility counterparts to written opinions regarding religious beliefs—both opinions that support and contradict their own beliefs. Ancillary analyses show a moderate curvilinear relation between strength of religious beliefs and intellectual humility in the religion domain, with lower humility accompanying stronger views in favor of and against religious beliefs.

The goal of this manuscript is describe strategies for maximizing the yield of data from small samples in prevention research. We begin by discussing what “small” means as a description of sample size in prevention research. We then present a series of practical strategies for getting the most out of data when sample size is small and constrained. Our focus is the prototypic between-group test for intervention effects; however, we touch on the circumstance in which intervention effects are qualified by one or more moderators. We conclude by highlighting the potential usefulness of graphical methods when sample size is too small for inferential statistical methods.

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