Evolvable traits of organisms can alter the environment those organisms experience. While it is well appreciated that those modified environments can influence natural selection to which organisms are exposed, they can also influence the expression of genetic variances and covariances of traits under selection. When genetic variance and covariance change in response to changes in the evolving, modified environment, rates and outcomes of evolution also change. Here we discuss the basic mechanisms whereby organisms modify their environments, review how those modified environments have been shown to alter genetic variance and covariance, and discuss potential evolutionary consequences of such dynamics. With these dynamics, responses to selection can be more rapid and sustained, leading to more extreme phenotypes, or they can be slower and truncated, leading to more conserved phenotypes. Patterns of correlated selection can also change, leading to greater or less evolutionary independence of traits, or even causing convergence or divergence of traits, even when selection on them is consistent across environments. Developing evolutionary models that incorporate changes in genetic variances and covariances when environments themselves evolve requires developing methods to predict how genetic parameters respond to environments—frequently multifactorial environments. It also requires a population-level analysis of how traits of collections of individuals modify environments for themselves and/or others in a population, possibly in spatially explicit ways. Despite the challenges of elucidating the mechanisms and nuances of these processes, even qualitative predictions of how environment-modifying traits alter evolutionary potential are likely to improve projections of evolutionary outcomes.
identifies three such lines of argument, but I will focus on one in particular: "empirical aptness" (p. 270). Buskell defines empirical aptness as "a relationship between a researcher's resources and the generation of epistemic goods" (p. 271). Causal frameworks are such resources. We may think of empirical aptness as describing a tight "fit" between a causal framework and the aims of a particular research program. Therefore, if we are to choose between competing causal frameworks in a nonarbitrary fashion, they must differ with respect to the advantages they confer on empirical progress. If a biological concept is empirically apt, then, among other things, models that employ the concept may make accurate predictions or reveal causal mechanisms more frequently than models that do not employ the concept. 3 Arguments for an EES often rely on its promise that treating reciprocal causation as a central feature of adaptive evolution is empirically apt relative to the mainstream alternative.Given that empirical aptness concerns the practical power granted by a particular conceptual framework, I will characterize a second feature frequently found in arguments for an EES: "explanatory aptness." Let us define explanatory aptness as the relationship between a conceptual framework and its ontological implications-the map it draws of the natural world.Empirical aptness and explanatory aptness may come apart in interesting ways. A framework may be empirically apt if it is employed by models that enable reliable predictions of the relevant 3 These are not the only ways for a conceptual framework to be empirically apt. Buskell says that "while 'fit' could be understood in terms of a propensity to make more accurate predictions," this is intentionally left open (personal communication). In the same spirit, I have used generic language in the survey to measure beliefs about empirical aptness (e.g., "adjust our models," "shift in our research practices," etc.). Additionally, an anonymous referee helpfully suggests that a broader notion of empirical aptness may be necessary since evolutionary biology, a historical science, notoriously struggles with predictions. Still, I believe there is adequate support in the EES literature for using predictive power as a metric (but not the only metric) for empirical aptness (see, e.g.
In this paper, I argue that ‘art’, though an open concept, is not undefinable. I propose a particular kind of definition, a disjunctive definition, which comprises extant theories of art. I co-opt arguments from the philosophy of science, likening the concept ‘art’ to the concept ‘species’, to argue that we ought to be theoretical pluralists about art. That is, there are a number of legitimate, perhaps incompatible, criteria for a theory of art. In this paper, I consider three: functionalist definitions, procedural definitions, and an intentional-historical definition. The motivation for this pluralism comes from an analysis of practice, because the term is of apparent value to practitioners. However, a closer analysis of the concept reveals that, while disjunctive definitions help us to understand how we use certain terms (in other words, their pragmatic value), they lack ontological import. In sum, I attempt to glean lessons from the philosophy of science about the philosophy of art. If my analysis is correct, we ought to be eliminative pluralists about art as a concept.
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