Recent theories suggest that reward-based choice reflects competition between value signals in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC). We tested this idea by recording vmPFC neurons while macaques performed a gambling task with asynchronous offer presentation. We found that neuronal activity shows four patterns consistent with selection via mutual inhibition. (1) Correlated tuning for probability and reward size, suggesting that vmPFC carries an integrated value signal, (2) anti-correlated tuning curves for the two options, suggesting mutual inhibition, (3) neurons rapidly come to signal the value of the chosen offer, suggesting the circuit serves to produce a choice, (4) after regressing out the effects of option values, firing rates still could predict choice – a choice probability signal. In addition, neurons signaled gamble outcomes, suggesting that vmPFC contributes to both monitoring and choice processes. These data suggest a possible mechanism for reward-based choice and endorse the centrality of vmPFC in that process.

The ventral striatum (VS), like its cortical afferents, is closely associated with processing of rewards, but the relative contributions of striatal and cortical reward systems remains unclear. Most theories posit distinct roles for these structures, despite their similarities. We compared responses of VS neurons to those of ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) Area 14 neurons, recorded in a risky choice task. Five major response patterns observed in vmPFC were also observed in VS: (1) offer value encoding, (2) value difference encoding, (3) preferential encoding of chosen relative to unchosen value, (4) a correlation between residual variance in responses and choices, and (5) prominent encoding of outcomes. We did observe some differences as well; in particular, preferential encoding of the chosen option was stronger and started earlier in VS than in vmPFC. Nonetheless, the close match between vmPFC and VS suggests that cortex and its striatal targets make overlapping contributions to economic choice.

When we evaluate an option, how is the neural representation of its value linked to information that identifies it, such as its position in space? We hypothesized that value information and identity cues are not bound together at a particular point but are represented together at the single unit level throughout the entirety of the choice process. We examined neuronal responses in two-option gambling tasks with lateralized and asynchronous presentation of offers in five reward regions: orbitofrontal cortex (OFC, area 13), ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC, area 14), ventral striatum (VS), dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC), and subgenual anterior cingulate cortex (sgACC, area 25). Neuronal responses in all areas are sensitive to the positions of both offers and of choices. This selectivity is strongest in reward-sensitive neurons, indicating that it is not a property of a specialized subpopulation of cells. We did not find consistent contralateral or any other organization to these responses, indicating that they may be difficult to detect with aggregate measures like neuroimaging or studies of lesion effects. These results suggest that value coding is wed to factors that identify the object throughout the reward system and suggest a possible solution to the binding problem raised by abstract value encoding schemes.

Blanchard TC, Strait CE, Hayden BY. Ramping ensemble activity in dorsal anterior cingulate neurons during persistent commitment to a decision.

While standard models of risky choice account for the first and second statistical moments of reward outcome distributions (mean and variance, respectively), they often ignore the third moment, skewness. Determining a decisionmaker's attitude about skewness is useful because it can help constrain process models of the mental steps involved in risky choice. We measured three rhesus monkeys' preferences for gambles whose outcome distributions had almost identical means and variances but differed in skewness. We tested five distributions of skewness: strong negative, weak negative, normal, weak positive and strong positive. Monkeys preferred positively skewed gambles to negatively skewed ones and preferred strongly skewed and normal (i.e. unskewed) gambles to weakly skewed ones. This pattern of preferences cannot be explained solely by monotonic deformations of the utility curve or any other popular single account, but can be accounted for by multiple interacting factors.