This study investigates whether and how a firm's real earnings management (REM) is influenced by the strength of a country's legal regime and the presence of a Big 4 auditor. In a cross‐country examination using data from 22 countries, we find that REM increases in countries with stronger legal regimes as firms switch from accrual‐based earnings management (AEM) to REM. The presence of a Big 4 auditor reduces REM (as well as AEM) and attenuates the positive relation between legal regime strength and REM. Our results suggest that higher‐quality auditors limit client firms’ use of REM, especially in countries with a strong legal regime.
With scarce empirical support, prior literature argues that managers tend to withhold good news and promote bad news to preserve their bargaining power against labor unions. This paper provides evidence on this rarely supported argument. Using comprehensive firm-level data in Korea where labor unions have a long tradition of making credible threats, we find that overall disclosure frequency is negatively related to labor union strength, and that this relation is more pronounced in firms with good news. We also find that firms with strong labor unions withhold good news during the labor negotiation period and release it in an abrupt fashion afterwards and this pattern is more prominent than that of the firms with weak or no unions, implying that managers time news disclosure considering bargaining schedules to achieve better outcomes in labor negotiations. These results are robust to a battery of sensitivity tests.
With scarce empirical support, prior literature argues that managers tend to withhold good news and promote bad news to preserve their bargaining power against labor unions. This paper provides empirical evidence of this rarely supported argument. Using comprehensive firm-level data from South Korea, where labor unions have a long tradition of making credible threats, we find that overall disclosure frequency is negatively related to labor union strength, and that this relation is more pronounced in firms with good news. We also find that firms with strong labor unions withhold good news during the labor negotiation period and release it in a gradual fashion afterward and that this pattern is more prominent than that of firms with weak or no unions, implying that managers time news disclosures according to bargaining schedules to achieve better outcomes in labor negotiations. These results are robust to various sensitivity tests. Data, as supplemental material, are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.2075 . This paper was accepted by Mary Barth, accounting.
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