The work of Diamond and Dybvig, 1983 is commonly understood as a theory of bank runs driven by self‐fulfilling prophecies. Their contribution may alternatively be interpreted as a theory for preventing these bank runs. Absent aggregate risk over liquidity demand, they show that a simple scheme that suspends withdrawls when a target level of bank reserves is reached implements the efficient allocation as the unique equilibrium. Uniqueness implies that there cannot be a bank‐run equilibrium. Unfortunately, this scheme cannot implement the efficient allocation when there is aggregate uncertainty over every possible liquidity demand because any realization of liquidity demand may, in this case, be determined by fundamentals instead of psychology. When there is aggregate risk, Peck and Shell, 2003 demonstrate that the constrained efficient allocation can be implemented by a direct mechanism as an equilibrium. They show that the same mechanism can also implement a bank‐run equilibrium, which suggests that Diamond and Dybvig, 1983 can be understood as a theory of bank runs. The use of direct mechanisms, however, imposes a severe restriction on communications. We propose an indirect mechanism that (i) permits depositors to communicate their beliefs, not just their types, (ii) incentivizes depositors to communicate “rumors” of an impending bank run, and (iii) threatens to suspend payments conditional on what is revealed in these communications. We demonstrate that if commitment is possible, then under some weak parameter restrictions our indirect mechanism uniquely implements an allocation that can be made arbitrarily close to the the constrained efficient allocation as an equilibrium. In other words, our mechanism prevents bank runs.

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We model asset issuance in over-the-counter markets. Investors buy newly issued assets in a primary market and trade existing assets in a secondary market, where both markets are over the counter. We show that the level of asset issuance and its efficiency depend on how investors split the surplus in secondary market trade. If buyers get most of the surplus in secondary market trade, then sellers do not have incentives to participate in the primary market in order to intermediate assets and the economy has a low level of assets. On the other hand, if sellers get most of the surplus, buyers have strong incentives to participate in the primary market and the economy has a high level of assets. Equilibrium is inefficient for any splitting rule. The result follows from a double-sided hold-up problem in which it is impossible for all investors to take into account the full social value of an asset when trading. We propose a tax/subsidy scheme and show how it restores efficiency. We calibrate our model to match features of the US municipal bond market in order to quantify the effects of the intervention.The intervention leads to large welfare gains and, in response to a financial crisis caused by an aggregate demand shock, makes the crisis less severe and shorter relative to the economy with no intervention. JEL Classification: D53, D82, G14

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Experimental work in monetary economics is usually based on theory that incorporates an infinite horizon. Yet, hard constraints on laboratory sessions lead to finite times when the game must (with probability 1) end, and then simple backward induction implies monetary equilibria cannot exist. Hence, these experiments cannot evaluate subjects' ability to settle on the use of money as a medium of exchange, that ameliorates trading frictions, as an equilibrium outcome. To address this, we present some finite-horizon games where monetary exchange is an equilibrium outcome, and report some experimental results using these games.

We advance a theory of how private information and heterogeneous screening ability across market participants shapes trade in decentralized asset markets. We solve for the equilibrium market structure and show that the investors who intermediate trade the most and interact with the largest set of counterparties must have the highest screening ability. That is, the primary intermediaries are those with superior information-screening experts. We provide empirical support for the model's predictions using transaction-level micro data and information disclosure requirements. Finally, we study the connection between screening ability and efficiency, and observe that a market where all investors are screening experts-and thus, a market with no private information-may be dominated in terms of welfare by a market with no screening experts.