This paper presents a review of 100 empirical papers studying corporate codes of ethics (CCEs) in business organizations from the time period mid-2005 until mid-2016, following approximately an 11-year time period after the previous review of the literature. The reviewed papers are broadly categorized as content-oriented, output-oriented, or transformation-oriented. The review sheds light on empirical focus, context, questions addressed, methods, findings and theory. The findings are discussed in terms of the three categories as well as the aggregate, stock of empirical CCE studies in comparison with previous reviews, answering the question "where are we now?" Content and output studies still stand for the majority of the studies, whereas the transformation studies are fewer. Within these areas, two new trends are found to have emerged: discursive analyses and a focus on labor conditions. The review finds that (a) the content of CCEs is still predominantly self-defensive, (b) that CCEs are insufficient in themselves in terms of protecting workers' rights, (c) that CCEs are likely to encounter tensions when implemented across national and organizational boundaries, and (d) that while perception of CCEs is generally positive, CCEs may lead to both positive and negative outcomes. Based on these findings, potential areas for further exploration in the area of CCE research are suggested.

Policy makers and corporations have recently emphasized a code of ethics as an effective aspect of corporate governance. The corporate governance literature in accounting, however, provides little empirical or theoretical support for this emphasis. We address this gap between public policy and the literature by studying the effectiveness of a code of ethics in an experimental setting. Using Bicchieri's (2006) model of social norm activation, we predict that a code of ethics will improve manager return behavior and investor confidence to the extent that it activates social norms that control opportunistic behavior. Further, we predict that adding a certification choice whereby the manager can publicly certify that he will adhere to the code will enhance the potential for the code of ethics to activate such norms. We find that a code of ethics only improves manager return behavior and investor confidence when the code incorporates a public certification choice by the manager. When the code is present but there is no certification choice, manager return behavior does not improve and investor confidence erodes over time because of increased expectations that are not met by managers. An analysis of individual return decisions and exit questionnaire responses supports the activation of social norms as the underlying mechanism behind our results.

Prior research indicates that external auditors are willing to rely to a greater extent on the work of the internal audit (IA) function when the function has been outsourced, or co-sourced, as opposed to maintained in-house. This article addresses the extent to which this relationship between IA sourcing and external auditor reliance is moderated by the use of continuous auditing. One hundred forty-two auditors, all CPAs, participated in an experiment in which we manipulated both IA sourcing type (in-house versus outsourced) and audit type (periodic versus continuous) and measured ratings of external auditor reliance on the IA function. Results indicate that when the IA function uses periodic auditing, external auditors rely more on an outsourced function than an in-house function. However, when the IA function uses continuous auditing, external auditors do not differ in reliance on an outsourced or in-house function. The prior literature suggests that outsourcing an IA function can lead to higher levels of external auditor reliance and subsequently lower external audit costs. The results here suggest that maintaining the IA function in-house and employing continuous auditing may lead to similar external audit effects.

Policy makers and corporations have recently emphasized a code of ethics as an effective aspect of corporate governance. The corporate governance literature in accounting, however, provides little empirical or theoretical support for this emphasis. We address this gap between public policy and the literature by studying the effectiveness of a code of ethics in an experimental setting. Using Bicchieri's (2006) model of social norm activation, we predict that a code of ethics will improve manager return behavior and investor confidence to the extent that it activates social norms that control opportunistic behavior. Further, we predict that adding a certification choice whereby the manager can publicly certify that he will adhere to the code will enhance the potential for the code of ethics to activate such norms. We find that a code of ethics only improves manager return behavior and investor confidence when the code incorporates a public certification choice by the manager. When the code is present but there is no certification choice, manager return behavior does not improve and investor confidence erodes over time because of increased expectations that are not met by managers. An analysis of individual return decisions and exit questionnaire responses supports the activation of social norms as the underlying mechanism behind our results.

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This study examines the effects of reciprocity, self-awareness, and social value orientation on honesty in managerial reporting. I measure each manager's social value orientation personality characteristic and conduct an experimental study that manipulates two contextual factors: a hiring choice and a signature requirement. I find that managers are not homogeneous in their reporting decisions. Pro-socials provide more honest reports when they are required to sign the budget report or when they are endogenously hired. Pro-selfs provide more honest reports when they are endogenously hired, and the level of honesty incrementally increases when pro-selfs sign the budget report. I find no support for the signature requirement alone increasing the level of honesty exhibited by pro-selfs. The differences in intrinsic preferences between SVO types exposed to situational cues common in a participative budget setting have the potential to inform employee recruitment and selection by organizations to allow for efficient budgetary control.

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