Research on restatements has grown significantly in recent years. Many of these studies test hypotheses about the causes and consequences of intentional managerial misreporting but rely on restatement data (such as the GAO database) that contains both irregularities (intentional misstatements) and errors (unintentional misstatements). We argue that researchers can significantly enhance the power of tests related to restatements by distinguishing between errors and irregularities, particularly in recent periods when the relative frequency of error-related restatements is increasing. Based on prior research, the reading of numerous restatement announcements, and the guidance that boards receive from lawyers, auditors, and the SEC on how to respond to suspicions of deliberate misreporting, we propose a straightforward procedure for classifying restatements as either errors or irregularities. We show that most of the restatements we classify as irregularities are followed by fraud-related class action lawsuits as compared to only one lawsuit in the group of restatements classified as errors. As further validation of our proxy, we report that the market reaction to the restatement announcement for our irregularities sample (−14 percent) is also significantly more negative than it is for our errors sample (−2 percent). Finally, we demonstrate the importance of distinguishing errors from irregularities by showing the impact it has on inferences about the relation between restatements and CEO/CFO turnover over time.

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This study examines the conditions under which financial restatements lead corporate boards to dismiss external auditors and how the market responds to those dismissal announcements. We find that auditors are more likely to be dismissed after more severe restatements but that the severity effect is primarily attributable to the dismissal of non-Big 4 auditors rather than Big 4 auditors. We also document that among corporations with Big 4 auditors, those that are larger and more complex operationally are less likely to dismiss their auditors. Combined, this evidence suggests that firms with higher switching costs and fewer replacement auditor choices are less likely to dismiss their auditors after a restatement, which is informative to the debates about the costs and benefits of mandatory auditor rotation and limited competition in the audit market. Additionally, we examine contemporaneous executive turnover and find evidence that boards view auditor dismissals as complementary rather than substitute responses to restatements. Finally, we investigate the market reaction to auditor dismissals after restatements. The market reaction to the dismissal is significantly more positive following more severe restatements (5.9 percent) relative to less severe restatements (0.6 percent) when the client engages a comparably sized auditor. This positive market reaction is consistent with firms restoring financial reporting credibility by replacing their auditors and highlights the important role that auditors play in the financial markets. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources indicated in the text.

This study examines the effects of financial reporting complexity on investors’ trading behavior. I find that more complex (longer and less readable) filings are associated with lower overall trading, and that this relationship appears due to a reduction in small investors’ trading activity. Additional evidence suggests that the association between report complexity and lower abnormal trading is driven by both cross-sectional variation in firms’ disclosure attributes and variations in disclosure complexity over time. Given regulatory concerns over plain English disclosures and the trend toward more disclosure, my investigation into the effects of reporting complexity on small and large investors should be of interest to regulators concerned with reporting clarity and leveling the playing field across classes of investors.

This paper provides evidence that uncontested director elections provide informative polls of investor perceptions regarding board performance. We find that higher (lower) vote approval is associated with lower (higher) stock price reactions to subsequent announcements of management turnovers. In addition, firms with low vote approval are more likely to experience CEO turnover, greater board turnover, lower CEO compensation, fewer and better-received acquisitions, and more and better-received divestitures in the future. These findings hold after controlling for other variables reflecting or determining investor perceptions, suggesting that elections not only inform as a summary statistic, but incrementally inform as well.

R esearch on the credit rating process has primarily focused on how rating agencies incorporate firm characteristics into their rating opinions. We contribute to this literature by examining the impact of managerial ability on the credit rating process. Given debt market participants' interest in assessing default risk, we begin by documenting that higher managerial ability is associated with lower variability in future earnings and stock returns. We then show that higher managerial ability is associated with higher credit ratings (i.e., lower assessments of credit risk). To provide more direct identification of the impact of managerial ability, we examine chief executive officer (CEO) replacements and document that ratings increase (decrease) when CEOs are replaced with more (less) able CEOs. Finally, we show that managerial ability also has capital market implications by documenting that managerial ability is associated with bond offering credit spreads. Collectively, our evidence suggests that managerial ability is an important factor that bond market participants impound into their assessments of firm credit risk.