The force of uncertainty is central to every major research tradition in the study of international relations. Yet uncertainty has multiple meanings, and each paradigm has a somewhat unique understanding of it. More often than not, these meanings are implicit. I argue that realists define uncertainty as fear induced by anarchy and the possibility of predation; rationalists as ignorance (in a nonpejorative sense) endemic to bargaining games of incomplete information and enforcement; cognitivists as the confusion (again nonpejoratively) of decision making in a complex international environment; and constructivists as the indeterminacy of a largely socially constructed world that lacks meaning without norms and identities. I demonstrate how these different understandings are what provide the necessary microfoundations for the paradigms' definitions of learning, their contrasting expectations about signaling, and the functions provided by international organizations. This has conceptual, methodological, and theoretical payoffs. Understanding uncertainty is necessary for grasping the logic of each paradigm, for distinguishing them from each other, and promoting interparadigmatic communication.The force of uncertainty is central to every major research tradition in the study of international relations. Realists, rationalists, cognitivists, and constructivists all utilize it in their theories. It is arguably the most important factor in explaining the often unique dynamics of international as opposed to domestic politics. Yet a close look at these different paradigms reveals very different understandings of the concept. This article aims at a systematic conceptualization and categorization of uncertainty. While the focus is on international security, the insights have implications for international political economy and political science as a whole.Uncertainty has multiple meanings that broadly correspond to these four paradigms of international relations. I argue that realists generally define uncertainty as fear induced by the combination of anarchy and the possibility of predation; rationalists as ignorance (in a nonpejorative sense) endemic to bargaining games of incomplete information and enforcement; cognitivists as the confusion (again nonpejoratively) of decision making in a complex international environment, and constructivists as the indeterminacy of a largely socially constructed world that
Rationalist accounts of international cooperation maintain that states create international institutions to solve problems of distrust. They rest on a particular notion of trust, a strategic variety in which states trust based on information about others' interests. I seek to overturn this conventional wisdom. Drawing on social psychology, I point to the importance of generalized trust, an ideological belief about the trustworthiness of others in general. Generalized trust precedes institution-building and serves as a form of anarchical social capital, facilitating diffuse reciprocity and allowing state leaders to commit to multilateralism even in cases that rationalists deem inhospitable to cooperation and without the institutional protections that rationalists expect. In case studies of U.S. policy on the creation of the League of Nations and the United Nations, I demonstrate that generalized trust is necessary for explaining the origins of American multilateralism and the design of these organizations.
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