This article utilizes a unique data set to examine the relationship between a group of potential explanatory variables and educational corruption in Ukraine. Our corruption controls include bribing on exams, on term papers, for credit, and for university admission. We use a robust nonparametric approach in order to estimate the probability of bribing across the four different categories. This approach is shown to be robust to a variety of different types of endogeneity often encountered under commonly assumed parametric specifications. Our main findings indicate that corruption perceptions, past bribing behavior, and the perceived criminality of bribery are significant factors for all four categories of bribery. From a policy perspective, we argue that when bribe control enforcement is difficult, anti‐corruption education programs targeting social perceptions of corruption could be appropriate. (JEL K42, J16, C14)

Fiscal policy analysis in heterogeneous-agent models typically involves the use of smooth tax functions to approximate present tax law and proposed reforms. We argue that the tax detail omitted under this conventional approach has macroeconomic implications relevant for policy analysis. In this paper, we develop an alternative approach by embedding an internal tax calculator into a large-scale overlapping generations model that explicitly models key provisions in the Internal Revenue Code applied to labor income. While both approaches generate similar policy-induced patterns of economic activity, we nd that the similarities mask dierences in key economic aggregates and welfare due to variation in the underlying distribution of household labor supply responses. Absent sucient tax detail, analysis of specic policy changes particularly those involving large, discrete eects on a relatively small group of households using heterogeneous-agent models can be unreliable.JEL Codes: C63, E62, H30

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The macroeconomic effects of tax reform are a subject of significant discussion and controversy.