Goals are central to current treatments of work motivation, and goal commitment is a critical construct in understanding the relationship between goals and task performance. Despite this importance, there is confusion about the role of goal commitment and only recently has this key construct received the empirical attention it warrants. This meta-analysis, based on 83 independent samples, updates the goal commitment literature by summarizing the accumulated evidence on the antecedents and consequences of goal commitment. Using this aggregate empirical evidence, the role of goal commitment in the goal-setting process is clarified and key areas for future research are identified.

This article examines the relationship of employee perceptions of information privacy in their work organizations and important psychological and behavioral outcomes. A model is presented in which information privacy predicts psychological empowerment, which in turn predicts discretionary behaviors on the job, including creative performance and organizational citizenship behavior (OCB). Results from 2 studies (Study 1: single organization, N=310; Study 2: multiple organizations, N=303) confirm that information privacy entails judgments of information gathering control, information handling control, and legitimacy. Moreover, a model linking information privacy to empowerment and empowerment to creative performance and OCBs was supported. Findings are discussed in light of organizational attempts to control employees through the gathering and handling of their personal information.

Electronic workplace surveillance is raising concerns about privacy and fairness. Integrating research on electronic performance monitoring, procedural justice, and organizational privacy, the author proposes a framework for understanding reactions to technologies used to monitor and control employees. To test the framework's plausibility. temporary workers performed computer/Web-based tasks under varying levels of computer surveillance. Results indicated that monitoring job-relevant activities (relevance) and affording those who were monitored input into the process (participation) reduced invasion of privacy and enhanced procedural justice. Moreover, invasion of privacy fully mediated the effect of relevance and partially mediated the effect of participation on procedural justice. The findings are encouraging for integrating theory and research on procedural justice and organizational privacy.

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R isky organizational decisions are frequently made within the confines of performance periods with predefined durations and deadlines for achieving desired levels of performance. The relationship between performance and risk taking has been studied mostly across such periods but rarely within them. Building on the shifting-focus-of-attention model of organizational risk taking, we argue that the temporal proximity of deadlines regulates the focus of organizational attention within a performance period. Decision makers will focus their attention on attaining and maintaining aspirations early in a period; however, as deadlines approach, decision makers in underperforming firms will increasingly be likely to focus on ensuring survival, whereas decision makers in outperforming firms will increasingly be likely to focus on experimenting with slack resources. We propose that the relationship between performance and risk taking should thus be moderated by deadline proximity within a performance period. We tested and found support for our hypotheses in the context of 22,603 fourth-down decisions made by the 32 National Football League teams during the 2000-2005 regular season games. Our findings suggest that the notion of temporally bound performance periods and deadline proximity should play a more central role in attention-based frameworks of organizational risk taking.

Electronic monitoring research has focused predominantly on the reactions of monitored employees and less attention has been paid to the processes that trigger managers' decisions to electronically monitor subordinates. Employing a distributed virtual team simulation, this study examined the effects of dependence, future performance expectations, and propensity to trust on team leaders' decisions to electronically monitor their subordinates. Results indicate that team leaders electronically monitor subordinates more intensely when dependence on subordinates is high or future performance expectations are low. Moreover, team leaders are more likely to monitor in secret when dependence is high or propensity to trust is low. Although team leaders increased their level of electronic monitoring over time, this tendency was stronger when the leader had consistently low performance expectations.