This paper examines the impact of the recent financial crisis (2008)(2009) on the relation between a firm's risk and social performance (SP) using a sample of non-financial U.S. firms covering the period 1991-2012. We find that the relation between SP and risk is significantly different in the crisis period (post-crisis period) compared to the pre-crisis period. SP reduces volatility during the financial crisis. The risk reduction potential of SP is mainly due to the strengths component of SP. Since the relation of risk is stronger with SP strengths than SP concerns, this implies an asymmetric relation between these SP components and a firm's risk. Specifically, strengths act as a risk reduction tool during an adverse economic environment.
We examine shareholder initiated social policy proposals' capacity to exert pressure on management to force it to adopt the suggested changes in policy. We show that social proposals, filed under the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission's Rule 14a-8, have a more limited capacity to change corporate social policy than it has been previously reported. However, the capacity to exert pressure on firms can be substantially higher for some types of filers, notably pension funds and mutual funds. The analysis also suggests that the capacity to influence management is higher for some types of issues presented in the resolution, such as those related to board diversity, energy and environment, and international labor Miguel Rojas is a PhD candidate (Finance) Université du Québec a Montréal, Québec, Canada. He is also the corresponding author for this article. and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK. and human rights. We also provide suggestions explaining why shareholder activism is a persistent practice despite its limited results.
This study examines the relationship between CEO risk-taking incentives, measured by the sensitivity of CEO wealth held in options to a change in stock return volatility or Vega, and socially irresponsible activities using a large sample of U.S. firms during the period 1992-2012. Our results for the period before the 2007 financial crisis suggest that CEO risk-taking incentives are positively related to socially irresponsible activities. In addition, we find that a firm's socially responsible actions may act as a moderator, strengthening the aforementioned relationship. The results after the 2007 financial crisis show no evidence of a significant relationship between CEO risk-taking incentives and socially irresponsible activities. This could be due to the increased scrutiny regarding compensation packages and the increased role of reputational issues in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Our results suggest that risktaking incentives embedded in the CEO compensation scheme have implications for corporate policies toward socially irresponsible activities.
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