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From an economic point of view, legal considerations apart, tax avoidance, tax evasion and tax flight have similar effects, namely a reduction of revenue yields, and are based on the same desire to reduce the tax burden. Due to legal differences and moral concerns it is, however, likely that individuals perceive them as different and as unequally fair. Overall, 252 fiscal officers, business students, business lawyers, and entrepreneurs produced spontaneous associations to a scenario either describing tax avoidance, tax evasion, or tax flight, and evaluated them as positive, neutral or negative. The results indicate that everyday representations differ with respect to tax avoidance, tax evasion, and tax flight. Tax evasion was perceived rather negatively, tax flight neutrally, and tax avoidance positively. Although fiscal officers judged all forms of tax reduction least fair, all sub-samples found tax evasion less fair than tax avoidance or tax flight. With regard to knowledge of tax law and fairness perception, differential effects were found: Business lawyers and entrepreneurs judged tax avoidance the fairer the higher their knowledge was. Fiscal officers, on the other hand, found tax evasion especially unfair if their knowledge was high.

In this paper individual overconfidence within the context of an experimental asset market is investigated. Overall, 72 participants traded one risky asset on six markets of 12 participants each. The results indicate that individuals were not generally overconfident. Moreover, overconfidence was found to be moderated by the methodology used. Participants were well-calibrated as well as over-and underconfident during some trading periods with respect to the accuracy of their predictions, while their subjective confidence intervals were generally too narrow and overconfidence was found to increase with experience.

Little is known about how corporate hierarchies influence managers' propensity to pass information upward within the firm. Two streams of literature arrive at seemingly conflicting and untested predictions. Information economists maintain that middle managers pass more suggestions up the firm's line of command as the corporate hierarchy increases in order to avoid corporate omission errors. In contrast, scholars of organizational psychology suggest that hierarchies lead to evaluation apprehension and foster a perceived lack of control among midlevel managers, leading to their reduced willingness to, and interest in, passing information up within the organization. Drawing on field data and model-guided experimental studies, we provide original empirical evidence for the relevance of all the mechanisms above, and we delineate the conditions under which either mechanism prevails.

Many important decisions are routinely made by transient and temporary teams, which perform their duty and disperse. Team members often continue making similar decisions as individuals. We study how the experience of team decision-making affects subsequent individual decisions in two seminal probability and reasoning tasks, the Monty Hall problem and the Wason selection task. Both tasks are hard and involve a general rule, thus allowing for knowledge transfers, and can be embedded in the context of markets that offer identical incentives to teams and individuals. Our results show that teams trade closer to the rational level, learn the solution faster, and achieve this with weaker, less specific, performance feedback than individuals. Most importantly, we observe significant knowledge transfers from team decision-making to subsequent individual performances that take place up to five weeks later, indicating that exposure to team decision-making has strong positive spillovers on the quality of individual decisions.Teams Make You Smarter 3 INTRODUCTIONMany important decisions that, in principle, could be made by individuals are routinely made by teams. These include strategic decisions (e.g., boards of directors deciding in which markets to compete), allocation decisions (e.g., committees deciding on budgets), merit-based forecasting decisions (e.g., scientific panels deciding which research proposals to fund), intellective decisions (e.g., committees solving complex problems) and judgmental decisions (e.g., juries judging musical, literary, sport, and beauty contests).Most of these decisions are made by teams which are transient and temporary, being assembled by an external coordinator or supervisor or which congregate spontaneously and voluntarily for a short duration, ranging from a few days (jury in a trial or a musical contest) to a few years (scientific review boards or directors of a company). These teams perform their duty and then disperse. Members are frequently selected based on their qualifications, experience or expertise, and often continue to make similar decisions as individuals when their service on the team is concluded. While there is considerable research comparing the nature and quality of the decisions made by teams and individuals (see Charness &Sutter, 2012, andKugler, Kausel &Kocher, 2012, for recent reviews), relatively little is known about the effects of being on a team on subsequent individual decisions. However, since teamwork is ubiquitous in organizations, it is highly relevant, and potentially very beneficial, for companies to learn whether team decision-making has a positive impact on the decisionmaking of individuals.In this paper, we study whether being part of a team is beneficial beyond the actual interaction by investigating individual performance of former team members up to five weeks after the team interaction took place. We use two seminal intellective tasksa probability judgment task (the Monty Hall problem) and a reasoning task (the Wason selection problem).To offer unam...