This paper examines the portability of star security analysts' performance. Star analysts who switched employers experienced an immediate decline in performance that persisted for at least five years. This decline was most pronounced among star analysts who moved to firms with lesser capabilities and those who moved solo, without other team members. Star analysts who moved between two firms with equivalent capabilities also exhibited a drop in performance, but only for two years. Those who switched to firms with better capabilities and those who moved with other team members exhibited no significant decline in short-term or long-term performance. These findings suggest that firm-specific skills and firms' capabilities both play important roles in star analysts' performance. In addition, we find that firms that hire star analysts from competitors with better capabilities suffered more extreme negative stock-market reactions than those that hire from comparable or lesser firms. These findings suggest that hiring stars may be perceived as value destroying and may not improve a firm's competitive advantage.firm-specific performance, team-specific performance, firm capabilities, productivity, mobility, knowledge workers
Can groups become effective simply by assembling high-status individual performers? Though an affirmative answer may seem straightforward on the surface, this answer becomes more complicated when group members benefit from collaborating on interdependent tasks. Examining Wall Street sell-side equity research analysts who work in an industry in which individuals strive for status, we find that groups benefited—up to a point—from having high-status members, controlling for individual performance. With higher proportions of individual stars, however, the marginal benefit decreased before the slope of this curvilinear pattern became negative. This curvilinear pattern was especially strong when stars were concentrated in a small number of sectors, likely reflecting suboptimal integration among analysts with similar areas of expertise. Control variables ensured that these effects were not the spurious result of individual performance, department size or specialization, or firm prestige. We discuss the theoretical implications of these results for the literatures on status and groups, along with practical implications for strategic human resource management.
This paper examines exploration and exploitation in professional service firms by focusing on the individuals who carry out the exploration and exploitation activities. Specifically, we examine the performance of star security analysts who join new firms in exploration versus exploitation roles. We find that stars hired to explore (initiate new activities) experience a short- and long-term performance decline; by contrast, stars who join new firms to exploit (reinforce existing activities) suffer only a short-term drop in performance. Stars hired in exploration roles can preserve some of their performance by moving with a group of colleagues from the originating firm. Investors view the hiring of a star analyst as value-destroying for the hiring firm regardless of whether the firm is hiring to exploit or explore, but the negative reactions are economically more extreme for exploration hires. These findings indicate that, even at the individual level, probabilities of success in exploration activities are lower than in exploitation activities, thereby reinforcing the tendency toward exploitation.
We use proprietary data from a major investment bank to investigate factors associated with analysts' annual compensation. We find compensation to be positively related to "All-Star" recognition, investment-banking contributions, the size of analysts' portfolios, and whether an analyst is identified as a top stock-picker by the Wall Street Journal. We find no evidence that compensation is related to earnings forecast accuracy. But consistent with prior studies, we find analyst turnover to be related to forecast accuracy, suggesting that analyst forecasting incentives are primarily termination-based. Additional analyses indicate that "All-Star" recognition proxies for buy-side client votes on analyst research quality used to allocate commissions across banks and analysts. Taken as a whole, our evidence is consistent with analyst compensation being designed to reward actions that increase brokerage and investment-banking revenues. To assess the generality of our findings, we test the same relations using compensation data from a second high-status bank and obtain similar results.JEL Classification: G24, G29, J33, J44, L84, M41, M52
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