Abstract:The internet and associated Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) are diffusing at an astounding pace. As data centers (DCs) proliferate to accommodate this rising demand, their environmental impacts grow too. While the energy efficiency of DCs has been researched extensively, their water footprint (WF) has so far received little to no attention. This article conducts a preliminary WF accounting for cooling and energy consumption in DCs. The WF of DCs is estimated to be between 1047 and 151,061 m 3 /TJ. Outbound DC data traffic generates a WF of 1-205 liters per gigabyte (roughly equal to the WF of 1 kg of tomatos at the higher end). It is found that, typically, energy consumption constitues by far the greatest share of DC WF, but the level of uncertainty associated with the WF of different energy sources used by DCs makes a comprehensive assessment of DCs' water use efficiency very challenging. Much better understanding of DC WF is urgently needed if a meaningful evaluation of this rapidly spreading service technology is to be gleaned and response measures are to be put into effect.

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We develop a game theoretic model of the role of foresight in games involving users interacting over a public good. Previous research in this area has applied game theory to understand social dilemmas and inform policy initiatives. However, considerations of the “evolving structure” of natural resource games over time and agents' planning horizon raises the complexity of game analysis substantially and has often been overlooked. We analyze a simple model of an irrigation system shared by two users and consider how players will act under different levels of foresight. Without foresight into game changes over time, players are blind to the fact that they are in a game of chicken. We model agents with foresight by interconnecting games across time and show how this creates opportunities for “strategic loss” early on, allowing players with foresight to reduce total costs. High future costs can thus be avoided with foresight if the rising costs of inaction are made apparent. We consider the effect of discounting and differences between players to provide policy recommendations regarding incentives for foresight.

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