During the first 6 months of 2016, large outbreaks of Zika virus disease caused by local mosquito-borne transmission occurred in Puerto Rico and other U.S. territories, but local mosquito-borne transmission was not identified in the continental United States (1,2). As of July 22, 2016, the Florida Department of Health had identified 321 Zika virus disease cases among Florida residents and visitors, all occurring in either travelers from other countries or territories with ongoing Zika virus transmission or sexual contacts of recent travelers.* During standard case investigation of persons with compatible illness and laboratory evidence of recent Zika virus infection (i.e., a specimen positive by real-time reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction [rRT-PCR], or positive Zika immunoglobulin M [IgM] with supporting dengue serology [negative for dengue IgM antibodies and positive for dengue IgG antibodies], or confirmation of Zika virus neutralizing antibodies by plaque reduction neutralization testing [PRNT]) (3), four persons were identified in Broward and Miami-Dade counties whose infections were attributed to likely local mosquito-borne transmission. Two of these persons worked within 120 meters (131 yards) of each other but had no other epidemiologic connections, suggesting the possibility of a local community-based outbreak. Further epidemiologic and laboratory investigations of the worksites and surrounding neighborhood identified a total of 29 persons with laboratory evidence of recent Zika virus infection and likely exposure during late June to early August, most within an approximate 6-block area. In response to limited impact on the population of Aedes aegypti mosquito vectors from initial ground-based mosquito control efforts, aerial ultralow volume spraying with the organophosphate insecticide naled was applied over a 10 square-mile area beginning in early August and alternated with aerial larviciding with Bacillus thuringiensis subspecies israelensis (Bti), a group biologic control agent, in a central 2 square-mile area. No additional cases were identified after implementation of this mosquito control strategy. No increases in emergency department (ED) patient visits associated with aerial spraying were reported, including visits for asthma, reactive airway disease, wheezing, shortness of breath, nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. Local and state health departments serving communities where Ae. aegypti, the primary vector of Zika virus, is found should continue to actively monitor for local transmission of the virus.(†).

publicly funded repositories, such as the WHO COVID database with rights for unrestricted research re-use and analyses in any form or by any means with acknowledgement of the original source. These permissions are granted for free by Elsevier for as long as the COVID-19 resource centre remains active. Article Travel Surveillance and Genomics Uncover a Hidden Zika Outbreak during the Waning EpidemicGraphical Abstract Highlights d Travel surveillance and genomics uncovered hidden Zika transmission d An unreported and 1-year delayed Zika outbreak was detected in Cuba d Mosquito control may delay, not prevent, Zika virus establishment d A surveillance framework to detect hidden outbreaks was created

Objectives From 2016 to 2018 Florida documented 1471 cases of Zika virus, 299 of which were pregnant women (Florida Department of Health, https ://www.flori dahea lth.gov/disea ses-and-condi tions /mosqu ito-borne disea ses/surve illan ce.html, 2019a). Florida's response required unprecedented rapid and continuous cross-sector communication, adaptation, and coordination. Zika tested public health systems in new ways, particularly for maternal child health populations. The systems are now being challenged again, as the Coronavirus COVID-19 pandemic spreads throughout Florida. This qualitative journey mapping evaluation of Florida's response focused on care for pregnant women and families with infants exposed to Zika virus. Methods Fifteen focus groups and interviews were conducted with 33 public health and healthcare workers who managed outbreak response, case investigations, and patient care in south Florida. Data were thematically analyzed, and the results were framed by the World Health Organization's (WHO) Healthcare Systems Framework of six building blocks: health service delivery, health workforce, health information systems, access to essential medicines, financing, and leadership and governance (World Health Organization, https ://www.who.int/healt hsyst ems/strat egy/every bodys _busin ess.pdf, 2007, https ://www.who.int/healt hinfo /syste ms/monit oring /en/, 2010). Results Results highlighted coordination of resources, essential services and treatment, data collection, communication among public health and healthcare systems, and dissemination of information. Community education, testing accuracy and turnaround time, financing, and continuity of health services were areas of need, and there was room for improvement in all indicator areas. Conclusions The WHO Framework encapsulated important infrastructure and process factors relevant to the Florida Zika response as well as future epidemics. In this context, similarities, differences, and implications for the Coronavirus COVID-19 pandemic response are discussed.

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