A classical question in philosophy and psychology is if the sense of one's body influences how one visually perceives the world. Several theoreticians have suggested that our own body serves as a fundamental reference in visual perception of sizes and distances, although compelling experimental evidence for this hypothesis is lacking. In contrast, modern textbooks typically explain the perception of object size and distance by the combination of information from different visual cues. Here, we describe full body illusions in which subjects experience the ownership of a doll's body (80 cm or 30 cm) and a giant's body (400 cm) and use these as tools to demonstrate that the size of one's sensed own body directly influences the perception of object size and distance. These effects were quantified in ten separate experiments with complementary verbal, questionnaire, manual, walking, and physiological measures. When participants experienced the tiny body as their own, they perceived objects to be larger and farther away, and when they experienced the large-body illusion, they perceived objects to be smaller and nearer. Importantly, despite identical retinal input, this “body size effect” was greater when the participants experienced a sense of ownership of the artificial bodies compared to a control condition in which ownership was disrupted. These findings are fundamentally important as they suggest a causal relationship between the representations of body space and external space. Thus, our own body size affects how we perceive the world.

Size perception is most often explained by a combination of cues derived from the visual system. However, this traditional cue approach neglects the role of the observer’s body beyond mere visual comparison. In a previous study, we used a full-body illusion to show that objects appear larger and farther away when participants experience a small artificial body as their own and that objects appear smaller and closer when they assume ownership of a large artificial body (“Barbie-doll illusion”; van der Hoort, Guterstam, & Ehrsson, PLoS ONE, 6(5), e20195, 2011). The first aim of the present study was to test the hypothesis that this own-body-size effect is distinct from the role of the seen body as a direct familiar-size cue. To this end, we developed a novel setup that allowed for occlusion of the artificial body during the presentation of test objects. Our results demonstrate that the feeling of ownership of an artificial body can alter the perceived sizes of objects without the need for a visible body. Second, we demonstrate that fixation shifts do not contribute to the own-body-size effect. Third, we show that the effect exists in both peri-personal space and distant extra-personal space. Finally, through a meta-analysis, we demonstrate that the own-body-size effect is independent of and adds to the classical visual familiar-size cue effect. Our results suggest that, by changing body size, the entire spatial layout rescales and new objects are now perceived according to this rescaling, without the need to see the body.

The size of our body influences the perceived size of the world so that objects appear larger to children than to adults. The mechanisms underlying this effect remain unclear. It has been difficult to dissociate visual rescaling of the external environment based on an individual’s visible body from visual rescaling based on a central multisensory body representation. To differentiate these potential causal mechanisms, we manipulated body representation without a visible body by taking advantage of recent developments in body representation research. Participants experienced the illusion of having a small or large invisible body while object-size perception was tested. Our findings show that the perceived size of test-objects was determined by the size of the invisible body (inverse relation), and by the strength of the invisible body illusion. These findings demonstrate how central body representation directly influences visual size perception, without the need for a visible body, by rescaling the spatial representation of the environment.

The sense of ownership of one’s body is important for survival, e.g., in defending the body against a threat. However, in addition to affecting behavior, it also affects perception of the world. In the case of visuospatial perception, it has been shown that the sense of ownership causes external space to be perceptually scaled according to the size of the body. Here, we investigated the effect of ownership on another fundamental aspect of visual perception: visual awareness. In two binocular rivalry experiments, we manipulated the sense of ownership of a stranger’s hand through visuotactile stimulation while that hand was one of the rival stimuli. The results show that ownership, but not mere visuotactile stimulation, increases the dominance of the hand percept. This effect is due to a combination of longer perceptual dominance durations and shorter suppression durations. Together, these results suggest that the sense of body ownership promotes visual awareness.

Evolutionary psychology has been proposed as a metatheory for the social sciences. In this paper, the different ways in which scholars have used the concept of a metatheory in the field of evolutionary psychology is reviewed. These different ways include evolutionary psychology as a unification of different subdisciplines, as a nomological network of evidence, as Lakatosian hard core, as a tool for conceptual integration, and as a theory that addresses the major issues in the social sciences. It is concluded that evolutionary psychology has been successful as Lakatosian hard core, that is, it has been fruitful in generating new hypotheses. However, it has been less successful in unifying different subdisciplines. It is also concluded that evolutionary psychology needs to broaden its scope by including insights from evolutionary developmental biology in order to become a unifying framework for the social sciences.