We examine the impact of managerial financial reporting incentives on accounting quality changes around International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption. A novel feature of our single-country setting based on Germany is that voluntary IFRS adoption was allowed and common before IFRS became mandatory. We exploit the revealed preferences in the choice to (not) adopt IFRS voluntarily to determine whether the management of individual firms had incentives to adopt IFRS. For comparability with previous studies, we assess accounting quality through multiple constructs such as earnings management, timely loss recognition, and value relevance. While most existing literature documents accounting quality improvements following IFRS adoption, we find that improvements are confined to firms with incentives to adopt, that is, voluntary adopters. We also find that firms that resist IFRS adoption have closer connections with banks and inside shareholders, consistent with lower incentives for more comprehensive accounting standards. The overall results indicate that reporting incentives dominate accounting standards in determining accounting quality. We conclude that it is unwarranted to infer from evidence on accounting quality changes around voluntary adoption that IFRS per se improves accounting quality.

We model managers' equilibrium strategies for voluntarily disclosing information about their firm's risk. We consider a multifirm setting in which the variance of each firm's future cash flow is uncertain. A manager can disclose, at a cost, this variance before offering the firm for sale in a competitive stock market with risk-averse investors. In our partial disclosure equilibrium, managers voluntarily disclose if their firm has a low variance of future cash flows, but withhold the information if their firm has highly variable future cash flows. We establish how the manager's discretionary risk disclosure affects the firm's share price, expected stock returns, and beta, within the framework of the Capital Asset Pricing Model. We show that whereas one manager's discretionary disclosure of his firm's risk does not affect other firms' share prices, it does affect the other firms' betas. Also, we demonstrate that a disclosing firm has lower risk premium and beta ex post than a nondisclosing firm. Finally, we show that ex ante, the expected risk premium and expected beta of each firm are higher under a mandatory risk disclosure regime than in the partial disclosure equilibrium that arises under a voluntary disclosure regime.

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International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) allow managers flexibility in classifying interest paid, interest received, and dividends received within operating, investing, or financing activities within the statement of cash flows. In contrast, U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) requires these items to be classified as operating cash flows (OCF). Studying IFRS-reporting firms in 13 European countries, we document firms' cash-flow classification choices vary, with about 76, 60, and 57% of our sample classifying interest paid, interest received, and dividends received, respectively, in OCF. Reported OCF under IFRS tends to exceed what would be reported under U.S. GAAP. We find the main determinants of OCF-enhancing classification choices are capital market incentives and other firm characteristics, including greater likelihood of financial distress, higher leverage, and accessing equity markets more frequently. In analyzing the consequences of reporting flexibility, we find some evidence that the market's assessment of the persistence of Rev Account Stud (2017)

To what degree are audit fees for U.S. firms with publicly traded equity higher than fees for otherwise similar firms with private equity? The answer is potentially important for evaluating regulatory regime design efficiency and for understanding audit demand and production economics. For U.S. firms with publicly traded debt, we hold constant the regulatory regime, including mandated issuer reporting and auditor responsibilities. We vary equity ownership and thus public securities market contextual factors, including any related public firm audit fees from increased audit effort to reduce audit litigation risk and/or pure litigation risk premium (litigation channel effects). In cross‐section, we find that audit fees for public equity firms are 20–22% higher than fees for otherwise similar private equity firms. Time‐series comparisons for firms that change ownership status yield larger percentage fee increases (decreases) for those going public (private). Results are consistent with litigation channel effects giving rise to substantial incremental audit fees for U.S. firms with public equity ownership.

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Based on gaining privileged access to interview senior representatives of audit firms, regulatory bodies, financial institutions, universities and other organisations in mainland China, Hong Kong and the UK, this exploratory study presents a range of informed views about the rapid development of China's auditing profession over the last 25 years. It explores the emerging roles of the firms in the 2nd-tier international networks and among the larger stand-alone firms as challengers to the Big 4, nationally and internationally. It identifies national and international institutional interactions that have shaped and are being shaped by this rapid growth, with particular reference to the overarching role of the State's shifting strategies to create a domestic profession in China that can compete internationally. The potential consequences, given China's unequalled size and its expanding global influence, could change the nature and structure of the global profession. A significant contribution of this exploratory empirical study has been to deconstruct the continuing conventional political and academic rhetoric that dichotomises firms into 'foreign vs local' and 'Big 4 vs other'. It contributes new voices and alternative perspectives to the emerging literature on the glocalization of large professional services firms and suggests new opportunities for future auditing research.