Study Objectives: Although sleep deprivation has long been known to negatively affect cognitive performance, the exact mechanisms through which it acts and what cognitive domains are affected most is still disputed. The current study provides a theory-driven approach to examine and explain the detrimental effects of sleep loss with a focus on attention and cognitive control. Methods: Twenty-four participants (12 females; age: 24 ± 3 years) completed the experiment that involved laboratory-controlled overnight sleep deprivation and two control conditions, namely, a normally rested night at home and a night of sleep in the laboratory. Using a stop signal task in combination with electroencephalographic recordings, we dissociated different processes contributing to task performance such as sustained attention, automatic or bottom-up processing, and strategic or top-down control. At the behavioral level, we extracted reaction times, response accuracy, and markers of behavioral adjustments (posterror and post-stop slowing), whereas at the neural level event-related potentials (ERP) found in context of response inhibition (N2/P3) and error monitoring (ERN/P e) were obtained. Results: It was found that 24 hr of sleep deprivation resulted in declined sustained attention and reduced P300 and P e amplitudes, demonstrating a gradual breakdown of top-down control. In contrast, N200 and ERN as well as the stop-signal reaction time showed higher resilience to sleep loss signifying the role of automatic processing. Conclusions: These results support the notion that sleep deprivation is more detrimental to cognitive functions that are relatively more dependent on mental effort and/or cognitive capacity, as opposed to more automatic control processes.

Objective: The objective of this study was to test whether properties of 1-s segments of spontaneous scalp EEG activity can be used to automatically distinguish the awake state from the anesthetized state in patients undergoing general propofol anesthesia.Methods: Twenty five channel EEG was recorded from 10 patients undergoing general intravenous propofol anesthesia with remifentanil during anterior cervical discectomy and fusion. From this, we extracted properties of the EEG by applying the Directed Transfer Function (DTF) directly to every 1-s segment of the raw EEG signal. The extracted properties were used to develop a data-driven classification algorithm to categorize patients as “anesthetized” or “awake” for every 1-s segment of raw EEG.Results: The properties of the EEG signal were significantly different in the awake and anesthetized states for at least 8 of the 25 channels (p < 0.05, Bonferroni corrected Wilcoxon rank-sum tests). Using these differences, our algorithms achieved classification accuracies of 95.9%.Conclusion: Properties of the DTF calculated from 1-s segments of raw EEG can be used to reliably classify whether the patients undergoing general anesthesia with propofol and remifentanil were awake or anesthetized.Significance: This method may be useful for developing automatic real-time monitors of anesthesia.

How and to what extent electrical brain activity reflects pharmacologically altered states and contents of consciousness, is not well understood. Therefore, we investigated whether measures of evoked and spontaneous electroencephalographic (EEG) signal diversity are altered by sub-anaesthetic levels of ketamine compared to normal wakefulness, and how these measures relate to subjective experience. High-density 62-channel EEG was used to record spontaneous brain activity and responses evoked by transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) in 10 healthy volunteers before and during administration of sub-anaesthetic doses of ketamine in an open-label within-subject design. Evoked signal diversity was assessed using the perturbational complexity index (PCI), calculated from EEG responses to TMS perturbations. Signal diversity of spontaneous EEG, with eyes open and eyes closed, was assessed by Lempel Ziv complexity (LZc), amplitude coalition entropy (ACE), and synchrony coalition entropy (SCE). Although no significant difference was found in TMS-evoked complexity (PCI) between the sub-anaesthetic ketamine condition and normal wakefulness, all measures of spontaneous EEG signal diversity (LZc, ACE, SCE) showed significantly increased values in the sub-anaesthetic ketamine condition. This increase in signal diversity correlated with subjective assessment of altered states of consciousness. Moreover, spontaneous signal diversity was significantly higher when participants had eyes open compared to eyes closed, both during normal wakefulness and during influence of sub-anaesthetic ketamine. The results suggest that PCI and spontaneous signal diversity may reflect distinct, complementary aspects of changes in brain properties related to altered states of consciousness: the brain’s capacity for information integration, assessed by PCI, might be indicative of the brain’s ability to sustain consciousness, while spontaneous complexity, as measured by EEG signal diversity, may be indicative of the complexity of conscious content. Thus, sub-anaesthetic ketamine may increase the complexity of the conscious content and the brain activity underlying it, while the level or general capacity for consciousness remains largely unaffected.

Several theories link consciousness to complex cortical dynamics, as suggested by comparison of brain signal diversity between conscious states and states where consciousness is lost or reduced. In particular, Lempel-Ziv complexity, amplitude coalition entropy and synchrony coalition entropy distinguish wakefulness and REM sleep from deep sleep and anesthesia, and are elevated in psychedelic states, reported to increase the range and vividness of conscious contents. Some studies have even found correlations between complexity measures and facets of self-reported experience. As suggested by integrated information theory and the entropic brain hypothesis, measures of differentiation and signal diversity may therefore be measurable correlates of consciousness and phenomenological richness. Inspired by these ideas, we tested three hypotheses about EEG signal diversity related to sleep and dreaming. First, diversity should decrease with successively deeper stages of non-REM sleep. Second, signal diversity within the same sleep stage should be higher for periods of dreaming vs. non-dreaming. Third, specific aspects of dream contents should correlate with signal diversity in corresponding cortical regions. We employed a repeated awakening paradigm in sleep deprived healthy volunteers, with immediate dream report and rating of dream content along a thought-perceptual axis, from exclusively thought-like to exclusively perceptual. Generalized linear mixed models were used to assess how signal diversity varied with sleep stage, dreaming and thought-perceptual rating. Signal diversity decreased with sleep depth, but was not significantly different between dreaming and non-dreaming, even though there was a significant positive correlation between Lempel-Ziv complexity of EEG recorded over the posterior cortex and thought-perceptual ratings of dream contents.

An agent's actions can be influenced by external factors through the inputs it receives from the environment, as well as internal factors, such as memories or intrinsic preferences. The extent to which an agent's actions are "caused from within", as opposed to being externally driven, should depend on its sensor capacity as well as environmental demands for memory and context-dependent behavior. Here, we test this hypothesis using simulated agents ("animats"), equipped with small adaptive Markov Brains (MB) that evolve to solve a perceptual-categorization task under conditions varied with regards to the agents' sensor capacity and task difficulty. Using a novel formalism developed to identify and quantify the actual causes of occurrences ("what caused what?") in complex networks, we evaluate the direct causes of the animats' actions. In addition, we extend this framework to trace the causal chain ("causes of causes") leading to an animat's actions back in time, and compare the obtained spatio-temporal causal history across task conditions. We found that measures quantifying the extent to which an animat's actions are caused by internal factors (as opposed to being driven by the environment through its sensors) varied consistently with defining aspects of the task conditions they evolved to thrive in.

It remains unclear how specific cortical regions contribute to the brain’s overall capacity for consciousness. Clarifying this could help distinguish between theories of consciousness. Here, we investigate the association between markers of regionally specific (de)activation and the brain’s overall capacity for consciousness. We recorded electroencephalographic responses to cortical electrical stimulation in six rats and computed Perturbational Complexity Index state-transition (PCIST), which has been extensively validated as an index of the capacity for consciousness in humans. We also estimated the balance between activation and inhibition of specific cortical areas with the ratio between high and low frequency power from spontaneous electroencephalographic activity at each electrode. We repeated these measurements during wakefulness, and during two levels of ketamine anaesthesia: with the minimal dose needed to induce behavioural unresponsiveness and twice this dose. We found that PCIST was only slightly reduced from wakefulness to light ketamine anaesthesia, but dropped significantly with deeper anaesthesia. The high-dose effect was selectively associated with reduced high frequency/low frequency ratio in the posteromedial cortex, which strongly correlated with PCIST. Conversely, behavioural unresponsiveness induced by light ketamine anaesthesia was associated with similar spectral changes in frontal, but not posterior cortical regions. Thus, activity in the posteromedial cortex correlates with the capacity for consciousness, as assessed by PCIST, during different depths of ketamine anaesthesia, in rats, independently of behaviour. These results are discussed in relation to different theories of consciousness.

Knowledge of which brain properties are required for consciousness is essential for improving clinical diagnostics and therapy as well as for investigating consciousness per se. The search for such properties has yielded many methods and measures for distinguishing conscious and apparently unconscious brain states. Here, we present a systematic literature review of 255 electroencephalography (EEG)-based measures of consciousness in humans. We show that measures based on signal diversity and event related potentials appear to be the most consistent. Specifically, spectral entropy, Lempel Ziv complexity, and spectral edge frequency, seem most practical, consistent, and reproducible. However, since most studies did not collect current or retrospective subjective reports about experiences, the states of consciousness were usually assessed from behavior. Hence, the ground truth about presence or absence of phenomenological experience in such cases is often uncertain, thus limiting the conclusions that can be drawn. We provide detailed overviews of general categories and specific measures of consciousness, to serve as a basis for further studies and future development.

In the field of consciousness science, there is a tradition to categorize certain states such as slow-wave non-REM sleep and deep general anesthesia as “unconscious”. While this categorization seems reasonable at first glance, careful investigations have revealed that it is not so simple. Given that (1) behavioral signs of (un-)consciousness can be unreliable, (2) subjective reports of (un-)consciousness can be unreliable, and, (3) states presumed to be unconscious are not always devoid of reported experience, there are reasons to reexamine our traditional assumptions about “states of unconsciousness”. While these issues are not novel, and may be partly semantic, they have implications both for scientific progress and clinical practice. We suggest that focusing on approaches that provide a more pragmatic and nuanced characterization of different experimental conditions may promote clarity in the field going forward, and help us build stronger foundations for future studies.