Abstract:'Natural selection' is, it seems, an ambiguous term. It is sometimes held to denote a consequence of variation, heredity, and environment, while at other times as denoting a force that creates adaptations.I argue that the latter, the force interpretation, is a redundant notion of natural selection. I will point to difficulties in making sense of this linguistic practice, and argue that it is frequently at odds with standard interpretations of evolutionary theory. I provide examples to show this; one example involving the relation between adaptations and other traits, and a second involving the relation between selection and drift.

It is a plain fact that biology makes use of terms and expressions commonly spoken of as teleological. Biologists frequently speak of the function of biological items. They may also say that traits are ‘supposed to’ perform some of their effects, claim that traits are ‘for’ specific effects, or that organisms have particular traits ‘in order to’ engage in specific interactions. There is general agreement that there must be something useful about this linguistic practice but it is controversial whether it is entirely appropriate, and if so why it is.Many theorists have defended the use of seemingly teleological terms by appeal to an etiological notion of function (Wright, 1973; Millikan, 1984, 2002; Neander, 1991; Griffiths, 1993; Godfrey-Smith, 1994; and Buller, 1999). According to the etiological notion, attributing a function to a trait is a matter of pointing to effects that account for why the trait has been selected for.

PostprintThis is the accepted version of a paper published in Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences. This paper has been peerreviewed but does not include the final publisher proof-corrections or journal pagination.Citation for the original published paper (version of record):Brunnander, B. (2008) Is the language of intentional psychology an efficient tool for evolutionists?. Studies in History and Abstract:The language of intentional psychology is commonly used as a means of addressing issues concerning selection. This habit is generally considered an efficient shorthand, but oft-reported misunderstandings leave room for doubt. I stress the general point that efficiency of a mode of expression is an empirical matter, deserving the same treatment, theoretically and methodologically, as other such matters. Mistaken assumptions regarding the relevant cognitive capacities may make for inefficient communication, and discourse about human evolution is a plausible case in point.

Abstract:The target of this paper is the claim that natural selection accounts for the multiple realisation of biological and psychological kinds. I argue that the explanation actually offered doesn't provide any insight about the phenomenon since it presupposes multiple realisation as an unexplained premise, and this is what does all the work. The purported explanation mistakenly invokes the "indifference" of selection to structure as an additional explanatorily relevant factor. While such indifference can be explanatory in intentional contexts it isn't a causal factor at all in non-intentional nature. The upshot is that once the necessary initial assumption about heterogeneity is accepted there is no further explanation to do.

PostprintThis is the accepted version of a paper published in Metaphilosophy. This paper has been peer-reviewed but does not include the final publisher proof-corrections or journal pagination. is frequently no good reason why descriptive aims should be important, and there is a methodological problem in that the methods employed frequently fail to match the task description. This suggests that the task description as such may be the result of "default descriptivism," a tendency to take considerations that make sense of a practice to be the very considerations that generate it. Although such hypotheses are frequently quite plausible, the fact of the matter may not be very important for the pursuits of philosophers.