JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.. Academy of Management is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Academy of Management Review.Strategic alliances have been recognized as arenas with potential for opportunistic behavior by partners. Hence, a firm needs to have an adequate level of confidence in its partner's cooperative behavior. In this article we examine the notion of confidence in partner cooperation in alliances and suggest that it comes from two distinct sources: trust and control. We make the argument that trust and control are parallel concepts and that their relationship is of a supplementary character in generating confidence. In addition, we suggest that control mechanisms have an impact on trust level and that the trust level moderates the effect of control mechanisms in determining the control level. Finally, we discuss various ways to build trust within strategic alliances and important alliance control mechanisms.We thank Special Issue Editor Sim Sitkin and three anonymous AMR reviewers for their helpful comments.

The resource-based view of the firm has not been systematically applied to strategic alliances. By examining the role of firm resources in strategic alliances, we attempt, in this paper, to put forward a general resource-based theory of strategic alliances, synthesizing the various findings in the literature on alliances from a resource-based view. The proposed theory covers four major aspects of strategic alliances: rationale, formation, structural preferences, and performance. The resource-based view suggests that the rationale for alliances is the value-creation potential of firm resources that are pooled together. We note that certain resource characteristics, such as imperfect mobility, imitability, and substitutability, promise accentuated value-creation, and thus facilitate alliance formation. We discuss how the resource profiles of partner firms would determine their structural preferences in terms of four major categories of alliances: equity joint ventures, minority equity alliances, bilateral contract-based alliances, and unilateral contract-based alliances. As part of the theory, we propose a typology of inter-partner resource alignment based on the two dimensions of resource similarity and resource utilization, yielding four types of alignment: supplementary, surplus, complementary, and wasteful. We also discuss how partner resource alignment directly affects collective strengths and inter-firm conflicts in alliances, which in turn contribute to alliance performance. Finally, we develop a number of propositions to facilitate empirical testing of the theoretical framework, suggest ways to carry out this testing, indicate future research directions, and list some of the more significant managerial implications of the framework.

Trust and control are inextricably interlinked with risk in strategic alliances. Hence, to understand how partner firms can effectively reduce and manage this risk, we need to examine the inter-relationships between trust, control, and risk. In this article, we propose a comprehensive and integrated framework of the three constructs in the context of strategic alliances, contending that trust and control are the two principal antecedents of risk. First, we suggest that the three constructs are each comprised of certain key dimensions. Risk can be considered separately as relational risk and performance risk. The two dimensions of trust are identified as goodwill trust and competence trust, and control is differentiated in terms of the three modes of behaviour control, output control, and social control. Second, we discuss systematically the various linkages between the different types of trust, control, and risk in alliances. Third, we suggest several risk reduction approaches — minimizing relational risk through goodwill trust, behaviour control, and social control, while minimizing performance risk through competence trust, output control, and social control. Fourth, we discuss a number of trust-building techniques and control mechanisms to reduce risk in different types of strategic alliances. Finally, we develop propositions for empirical testing of the integrated framework and offer brief comments on future research directions and managerial implications

The instabilities of strategic alliances have been examined in the literature through a number of theoretical approaches. Alliance instabilities refer to major changes or dissolutions of alliances that are unplanned from the perspective of one or more partners. Although the literature identifies certain characteristics of strategic alliances that may lead to their unplanned dissolution, the extent of our understanding of this subject appears to be fragmented and incomplete. In this article we propose a comprehensive framework for adequately understanding alliance instabilities based on the notion of internal tensions. We suggest that strategic alliances are sites in which conflicting forces develop and which can be viewed as being constituted by three key pairs of competing forces-namely, cooperation versus competition, rigidity versus flexibility, and short-term versus long-term orientation. This tensions framework helps us in explaining the intrinsic vulnerability of alliances in terms of a wide range of internal contradictions and enables us to examine, in an integrated manner, the incidence, dynamics, and eventual dissipation of the inherent instabilities. We discuss the interrelationships among the different internal tensions and their impacts on different types of strategic alliances. We also examine the termination of alliances through mergers/acquisitions and dissolution. Finally, we suggest ways to empirically test the various ideas and propositions developed here and indicate directions for further research.

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This paper examines the choice between equity and non-equity forms of interfirm alliances from an 'integrated risk' perspective, which combines relational risk and performance risk in inter-firm alliances. Relational risk relates to cooperation among alliance partners, while performance risk has to do with the hazards of not achieving the performance objectives of an alliance, given cooperation. We suggest that equity alliance is adopted to control relational risk, while non-equity alliance is aimed at minimizing performance risk. Existing studies on the choice of alliance configurations are examined from the proposed risk perspective, and a number of key propositions are advanced for empirical testing and further development of the perspective.

One of the key issues in understanding the developmental processes of strategic alliances is how the alliance conditions change over the different stages of alliance development. A related question concerns the nature of the co-evolutionary dynamics of alliances in terms of their constituent partner firms. In this article we propose an integrated process model of alliances that is based on alliance conditions, alliance developmental stages, and an alliance system comprising co-evolutionary elements. We suggest that alliance conditions, or the key characteristics of an alliance at any given moment, link the alliance environment (firm characteristics) and the alliance development process. We also explore how specific patterns of alliance conditions have differential impacts on the interactive elements of the alliance co-evolutionary system.