It is often said that the best system account of laws (BSA) needs supplementing with a theory of perfectly natural properties. The 'strength' and 'simplicity' of a system is language-relative and without a fixed vocabulary it is impossible to compare rival systems. Recently a number of philosophers have attempted to reformulate the BSA in an effort to avoid commitment to natural properties. I assess these proposals and argue that they are problematic as they stand. Nonetheless, I agree with their aim, and show that if simplicity is interpreted as 'compression', algorithmic information theory provides a framework for system comparison without the need for natural properties.Keywords: laws of nature; best system account; natural properties; algorithmic information theory; invariance theorem.RESUMEN: A menudo se dice que la explicación de las leyes del mejor sistema (BSA) requiere ser completada con una teoría de las propiedades perfectamente naturales. La 'fuerza' y la 'simplicidad' de un sistema son relativas a un lenguaje y sin un vocabulario fijo es imposible comparar sistemas rivales. Recientemente, varios filósofos han intentado reformular la BSA en un esfuerzo por evitar el compromiso con las propiedades naturales. Aquí valoro estas propuestas y argumento que son problemáticas en su forma actual. Sin embargo, comparto su objetivo y muestro que si la simplicidad es interpretada como 'compresión', la teoría algorítmica de la información proporciona un marco para la comparación sin necesidad de apelar a propiedades naturales.Palabras clave: Leyes de la naturaleza, explicación del mejor sistema, propiedades naturales, teoría algorítmica de la información, teorema de invariancia.
It has been argued that the fundamental laws of physics do not face a ‘problem of provisos’ equivalent to that found in other scientific disciplines (Earman, Roberts and Smith 2002) and there is only the appearance of exceptions to physical laws if they are confused with differential equations of evolution type (Smith 2002). In this paper I argue that even if this is true, fundamental laws in physics still pose a major challenge to standard Humean approaches to lawhood, as they are not in any obvious sense about regularities in behaviour. A Humean approach to physical laws with exceptions is possible, however, if we adopt a view of laws that takes them to be the algorithms in the algorithmic compressions of empirical data. When this is supplemented with a distinction between lossy and lossless compression, we can explain exceptions in terms of compression artefacts present in the application of the lossy laws.
We are becoming increasingly dependent on robots and other forms of artificial intelligence for our beliefs. But how should the knowledge gained from the “say-so” of a robot be classified? Should it be understood as testimonial knowledge, similar to knowledge gained in conversation with another person? Or should it be understood as a form of instrument-based knowledge, such as that gained from a calculator or a sundial? There is more at stake here than terminology, for how we treat objects as sources of knowledge often has important social and legal consequences. In this paper, I argue that at least some robots are capable of testimony. I make my argument by exploring the differences between instruments and testifiers on a well-known account of knowledge: reliabilism. On this approach, I claim that the difference between instruments and testifiers as sources of knowledge is that only the latter are capable of deception. As some robots can be designed to deceive, so they too should be recognized as testimonial sources of knowledge.
Social robots have been proposed as a technological solution to the crisis in eldercare. As care institutions face the dual problem of patients living longer (with many having chronic diseases) and a shortage of staff, it is hoped social robots can help alleviate some of the workload. This has generated a heated debate about the ethical justification of social robots in eldercare. Much of this debate has so far been undertaken from the perspective of Western ethical theories, such as utilitarianism, the capabilities approach, and rights-based theories of ethics. But the eldercare crisis is a global one and one part of the world where such robots are already in use is East Asia. For generations, people in East Asia have been guided by a very different set of ethical values. One tradition that continues to guide ethical thinking is Confucianism. In this paper I show that the existing arguments do not justify the ethical use of robots on Confucian grounds. However, Confucianism is not anti-technology and technology-based solutions to problems of eldercare can, in the right circumstances, be appropriate. I outline a three-part protocol for institutions that should be followed when considering the use of robots for patients and their families that follow a Confucian way of life.
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