This study builds on the functionalist approach to examine whether emotions are specifically and robustly linked to action tendencies outside of the laboratory. In the year following the events of 9/11, four samples, totaling 546 college students, participated in a series of studies. Participants reported their negative emotions after viewing photographs of the 9/11 attack. The behavior of the participants and their support for President Bush's decision to deploy troops in the Middle East were assessed as proxies for action tendencies. Anger specifically predicted support for military action. Fear predicted current and anticipated future avoidant behaviors. All of these links between emotion and action tendency were robust across the four naturalistic circumstances. The results supported the functionalist approach to emotions, and provided a new angle to understand the public support for war. The results are discussed in the context of frustration-aggression, fear tactics, dimensional and discrete views, as well as classic literature on war.The abundance of historical data and the dire consequences associated with war have attracted countless investigations. The widely cited causes for war include regional differences in religion, politics, and resources (Bennett & Rupert, 2003; de Mesquita, 1981), as well as the mindset of individual citizens (Cohrs & Moschner, 2002;Fiske, 1987). Although it is quantitatively convenient to understand war from a strictly analytical perspective, war is a hot-blooded enterprise fueled by

This study uses appraisal theory, functionalist approach to emotions, and recent theory on group emotions as a basic framework to model the genesis of supporting military action. During the year after the events of 9/11, 588 college students participated in a series of four studies that assessed religious affiliation, appraisal antecedents, anger response to viewing photographs of the 9/11 attack, and support for military action. Structural equation modeling demonstrated that the relation between support for the war and attitudes toward terrorism and relevance could be explained adequately by a model in which anger mediated the effects of attitudes and relevance on support. Attitudes toward terrorism were further identified as mediators that could explain the group effect by Christians. The result was not only generalizable across the conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq, but also in terms of how consent for war manifests itself--outright calls for bloodshed versus more subtle, politically loaded, posturing (e.g. entreaties to "support our troops").

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