The article Could Captain Scott have been saved? Cecil Meares and the second journey that failed, by Karen May and Sarah Airriess, first published in Polar Record in 2014 (May & Airriess, 2015), builds a case against Cecil Meares for a failure to restock One Ton Depot in accordance with Scott's instructions. The authors claim that Meares was guilty of disobedience, neglect of duty and ‘obfuscation’. However, their case is diminished – in my view – by three significant mistakes that undermine their charges against Meares. In the three sections below, I identify those mistakes and consider whether the strong claims May and Airriess make about Meares are justified.
Sir Ernest Henry Shackleton’s Imperial Trans-Antarctic Expedition (ITAE) 1914–1917, consisted of two parties – a Weddell Sea party led by Shackleton with Endurance, and a supporting Ross Sea depot-laying party, led by Captain Aeneas L.A. Mackintosh with Aurora. The purpose of this research paper is to consider why the Ross Sea party contracted scurvy and the Weddell Sea party did not. The authors suggest that for the Ross Sea shore party there was ineffectual leadership, insufficient medical care and sledging with excessive loads, and an inadequate diet for sledging, in both energy and vitamin C content. In their second season, depletion of vitamin C was again evident with one person dying. The Weddell Sea party, ably led by Shackleton, not only faced the arduous task of sledging heavy stores and moving camps in thick snow, but also had to haul three boats over pressure ridges, before reaching open water and rowing to Elephant Island. Here, the men lived almost exclusively on a fresh meat diet and were not affected by scurvy. This is the final paper for the trilogy commemorating the Ross Sea party centenary (the others are Harrowfield, 2013, 2015).
In September 1909 Captain Scott announced his intention to utilise dog transport in his dash for the Pole - this being his intention until as late as February 1911. In May 1911, Scott lectured expedition members about a new plan for their Southern Journey. His lecture notes include detailed calculations, based solely on ponies and men hauling the sledges – dogs and motor sledges were now surplus to requirements. In less than three months, Scott had supplanted his published scheme of advance. This article investigates evidence relating to Scott’s change of mind. A substantial amount of research has been undertaken and a credible explanation emerges. The First Depot Journey, with its loss of ponies, inadequate animal nutrition (both dogs and ponies) and crevasse incident wrecked Scott’s original scheme of advance. When he commenced detailed planning in April 1911, it became apparent his dogs could not reach the Pole. Scott’s leadership technique for getting his men to understand and support the new transport plan is examined and its influence on current perceptions of the expedition and its men is investigated.
It was brought to the Editors' attention that on publication of this article[1], two draft documents were included in the supplementary files along with their final versions. This was an error. The draft versions have been subsequently removed. The current published supplementary files are the final versions of these documents. The publishers apologise for this error.
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