This study assessed the role of rape myth acceptance (RMA) and situational factors in the perception of three different rape scenarios (date rape, marital rape, and stranger rape). One hundred and eighty-two psychology undergraduates were asked to emit four judgements about each rape situation: victim responsibility, perpetrator responsibility, intensity of trauma, and likelihood to report the crime to the police. It was hypothesized that neither RMA nor situational factors alone can explain how rape is perceived; it is the interaction between these two factors that best account for social reactions to sexual aggression. The results generally supported the authors' hypothesis: Victim blame, estimation of trauma, and the likelihood of reporting the crime to the police were best explained by the interaction between observer characteristics, such as RMA, and situational clues. That is, the less stereotypic the rape situation was, the greater was the influence of attitudes toward rape on attributions.

According to most post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) theories, memory mechanisms are involved in its development and maintenance. However, the specific memory characteristics responsible for this disorder are still not well known. In the present study, 210 participants having reported at least one traumatic experience were assigned to a PTSD or to a non-PTSD symptom profile group. Both groups rated their memories for their most traumatic and intense positive life events. We observed that the traumatic memories of PTSD profile participants were more clear, detailed and judged as significant compared with those of the non-PTSD profile group. However, participants in the first group acknowledged having more difficulties putting their traumatic memories into words and controlling these remembrances. These differences were absent in their positive memories. Additionally, clear relationships emerged between memory ratings and PTSD symptoms measures. Results are discussed according to fragmentation and superiority views of traumatic memories in PTSD.Experiencing a traumatic event normally leads to a state of psychological distress in which symptoms such as repeated and unwanted reexperiencing of the traumatic event, avoiding trauma-related situations and thoughts and hyperarousal and emotional numbing are common in the days after the event. Although most people tend to recover from these initial symptoms in the first few weeks, there are a significant number of people who continue exhibiting them months later. This constellation of disturbances is referred to as acute posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) when they persist at least 1 month after the experience and chronic PTSD if they are still present 3 months after (DSM-IV, American Psychiatric Association, 1994).Research in this field has devoted much effort to explain why some people recover from these traumatic experiences with no special help, while others continue suffering those symptoms months later. In order to give an appropriate explanation of this fact, many theories suggest that memory factors play a decisive role in the development of the disorder (e.g. Ã 0.05; ÃÃ 0.01; ÃÃÃ 0.001. h 2 is a measure of effect size. Correlations between traumatic and positive memory MCQ ratings with PTSD symptoms scores are also included in the last column (Pearson's r statistic). 124 J. L. Megías et al. Ã 0.05; ÃÃ 0.01; ÃÃÃ 0.001. h 2 is a measure of effect size.Correlations between traumatic and positive memory additional items ratings with PTSD symptoms scores are also included in the last column (Pearson's r statistic).

The main aim of this research was to study the cognitive architecture underlying causal/covariation learning by investigating the frequency of judgement effect. Previous research has shown that decreasing the number of trials between opportunities to make a judgement in a covariation learning task led to a higher score after an a or d type of trial (positive cases) than after b and c trials (negative cases). Experiment 1 replicated this effect using a trial-by-tria l procedure and examined the conditions under which it occurs. Experiment 2 demonstrated a similar frequency of judgement effect when the information was presented in the form of contingency tables. Associative or statistical single-mechanism accounts of causal and covariation learning do not provide a satisfactory explanation for these findings. An alternative belief revision model is presented.