This article examines the impact of varying mandatory pensions on saving, life insurance, and annuity markets in an adverse selection economy. Under reasonable restrictions, we find unambiguous effects on market size, participation rates, and equilibrium prices. The degree of adverse selection, whether a market is active or inactive, and social welfare are analyzed. Copyright The Journal of Risk and Insurance.
Le modèle standard de concurrence avec antisélection en assurance (Rothschild et Stiglitz) suppose que les types ne diffèrent que par leur probabilité d'accident. Supposant qu'ils puissent aussi différer par leur attitude face au risque, nous mettons en évidence des configurations inhabituelles : des équilibres multiples ; des profits strictement positifs ; de l'assurance aléatoire. Nous caractérisons les différents régimes d'équilibre possibles et analysons les paramètres qui les déterminent. Competitive Insurance Markets with Multidimensional Adverse Selection ABSTRACT.-In the Rothschild and Stiglitz model, assuming differences in risk aversions may lead to unusual equilibrium configurations like multiple equilibria, equilibrium positive profits, or random contracts. We characterize the various types of equilibria and give results on the determinants of the equilibrium regime. We conclude with a few remarks on classical equilibrium concepts in insurance economics, and we suggest policy implications.
The standard literature on the value of life relies on Yaari's (1965) model, which includes an implicit assumption of risk neutrality with respect to life duration. To overpass this limitation, we extend the theory to a simple variety of nonadditively separable preferences. The enlargement we propose is relevant for the evaluation of life-saving programs: current practice, we estimate, puts too little weight on mortality risk reduction of the young. Our correction exceeds in magnitude that introduced by the switch from the notion of number of lives saved to the notion of years of life saved.
This paper surveys the existing theoretical and empirical research on long term contracts inspired by the American experience. We analyze the role of take-or-pay clauses and price indexation rules, questioning whether regulation distorts optimal contract duration. The models we summarize allows us to discuss the economic fundamentals of the ED provisions on long-term contracts in the natural gas industry, pointing out that the ED position on long-term contracting seems to mix up contract duration and flexibility.
L LONG TERM TAKE-DR-PAY CONTRACTSAccording to Williamson (1979), when a transaction entails one party committing capital that has little value for other uses, the other party has a strong incentive to appropriate the rents arising from the relationship through opportunistic behavior. Anticipating this risk, also called the "hold-up" problem, buyers and sellers sign long-term contracts.The main drawback of simplistic long-term contracting is inflexibility in the face of demand and supply fluctuations. To mitigate this problem, parties will therefore stipulate specific clauses. In practice, an initial price constitutes a floor on the value of the contract. Prices are rigid downward, but they can raise following price escalators, like predefined increases per year or petroleum price index. In addition, redetermination clauses permit renegotiation of the terms ofthe contract at predetermined intervals.
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