In this paper I examine the question of whether ethicists are moral experts. I call people moral experts if their moral judgments are correct with high probability and for the right reasons. I defend three theses, while developing a version of the coherence theory of moral justification based on the differences between moral and nonmoral experience: The answer to the question of whether there are moral experts depends on the answer to the question of how to justify moral judgments. Deductivism and the coherence theory both provide some support for the opinion that moral experts exist in some way. I maintain - within the framework of a certain kind of coherence theory - that moral philosophers are 'semi-experts'.

In order to discuss the normative aspects of euthanasia one has to clarify what is meant by active and passive euthanasia. Many philosophers deny the possibility of distinguishing the two by purely descriptive means, e.g. on the basis of theories of action or the differences between acting and omitting to act. Against this, such a purely descriptive distinction will be defended in this paper by discussing and refining the theory developed by Dieter Birnbacher in his "Tun und Unterlassen". On this basis I will suggest a new definition of active and passive euthanasia.

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Active and passive euthanasia -The rehabilitation of an often criticized descriptive differenceAbstract. Definition of the problem: In order to discuss the normative aspects of euthanasia one has to clarify what is meant by active and passive euthanasia. Arguments and conclusion: Many theoreticians deny the possibility of distinguishing between the two by purely descriptive means, e.g. on the basis of theories of action or the differences between acting and omitting. On the contrary, such a purely descriptive distinction will be defended in this paper by summarizing and refining the theory of Dieter Birnbacher, which he developed in his book Tun und Unterlassen. I will suggest a new definition of active and passive euthanasia.Zusammenfassung. Um die normative Frage nach der Zulässigkeit von aktiver und passiver Sterbehilfe diskutieren zu können, muss man zuerst klären, worin genau aktive und passive Sterbehilfe bestehen. Dass man hier eine nicht moralisch motivierte Unterscheidung auf der Basis eines handlungstheoretischen Unterschieds von Tun und Unterlassen treffen kann, wird vielfach bezweifelt. In diesem Aufsatz soll eine solche rein deskriptive Unterscheidbarkeit verteidigt werden. Dazu wird die von Dieter Birnbacher in seinem Buch "Tun und Unterlassen" entwickelte Theorie vorgestellt und verfeinert, was in einer neuen Definition aktiver und passiver Sterbehilfe mündet.