In this paper, I argue that Plotinus does not limit the sphere of free human agency simply to intellectual contemplation, but rather extends it all the way to human praxis. Plotinus’s goal in the first six chapters of Ennead 6.8 is, accordingly, to demarcate the space of freedom within human practical actions. He ultimately concludes that our external actions are free whenever they actualize, in unhindered fashion, the moral principles derived from intellectual contemplation. This raises the question of how the freedom of practical actions might relate to the freedom of intellectual contemplation. After considering two previously offered models – a model of double activity, and an Aristotelian model of practical syllogism – I offer a third alternative, namely a model of moral attunement, according to which our rational desires assume a kind of ‘care of the soul’ through active supervision. Practical life is thus imbued with freedom to the extent that the soul supervises its actions to conform to its will and choice of the good.
RESUMO Neste artigo, argumento que a crítica de Plotino contra a deliberação divina na Enéada VI.7 não busca banir toda teleologia de sua filosofia da natureza. Ao contrário, sua crítica procura adequar a teleologia ao seu sistema metafísico de forma a torná-la consistente com os princípios básicos que regem o universo inteligível. Nesse sentido, Plotino não propõe banir das explicações naturais toda referência às noções de utilidade ou benefício, mas busca conciliar essas noções com uma ontologia na qual o Intelecto tem sempre prioridade sobre o mundo sensível. Para esse fim, Plotino introduz, em primeiro lugar, o que chamo de uma teleologia vertical, segundo a qual as diferentes espécies animais criam as condições necessárias para a manutenção de formas mais elevadas de vida inteligível, como genera. Em segundo lugar, Plotino introduz uma teleologia horizontal, por meio da qual os vários órgãos animais fornecem um coeficiente mínimo de conteúdo noético para cada espécie em seu respectivo nível ontológico. Desse modo, Plotino esboça uma teleologia propriamente ‘noética’ na Enéada VI.7.
Whether physical or emotional, I take pain to be an unpleasant private experience. The significance of the pain example, which will appear multiple times henceforth, is that most people take pain to be private to their owner in the strong sense that no one else can epistemically access the other's pain in the way that one has access to his own pain. 11 Austin gives the goldfinch example, among other places, in a 1946 essay entitled "Other Minds.
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