Abstract-The

These differences in attentional demands of performance readily lead to predictions concerning how situations that alter the deployment of cognitive resources-either by drawing attention toward execution or by taking attention away-will affect performance across skill levels.In two experiments, we manipulated deployment of attentional resources during on-line golf putting in an attempt to shed light on differences in control structures governing novice and expert sensorimotor skill execution. In Experiment 1, novice and expert golfers performed putts under skill-focused conditions intended to direct attention toward a component process of performance and also under dual-task conditions designed to draw attention away from execution via secondary task demands. If novices dedicate attention to controlling real-time execution, performance should be worse under dual-task than under skill-focused conditions, since nontask-related stimuli in the dual-task condition should occupy resources needed for primary skill execution (Nissen & Bullemer, 1987). Once a skill becomes well learned, however, attention should not be needed for step-by-step execution. Experts, then, may not be negatively affected by secondary task constraints (Allport, Antonis, & Reynolds, 1972). Yet attention prompted toward a componentprocess of well-learned performance may disrupt automated processes that normally run as uninterrupted routines.In Experiment 1, we found differences in the effect of attention as a function of skill level. Novice putting was more accurate under skill-focused than under dual-task attention conditions, but experts showed the opposite pattern. In Experiment 2, we pursued an implication of this conclusion-that any environment whose characteristics work to alter the attentionalresources available for on-line execution may have different effects on performance as 373Copyright 2004 Psychonomic Society, Inc.The authors thank John Bell, golf teaching professional, for his consultation on this project and his suggestion that expert golf putting accuracy may be enhanced by performance time constraints, and Allen R. In two experiments, we examined the attentional mechanisms governing sensorimotor skill execution across levels of expertise. In Experiment 1, novice and expert golfers took a series of putts under dual-task conditions designed to distract attention from putting and under skill-focused conditions that prompted attention to step-by-step performance. Novices performed better under skill-focused than under dual-task conditions. Experts showed the opposite pattern. In Experiment 2, novice and expert golfers putted under instructions that emphasized either putting accuracy or speed-the latter intended to reduce the time available to monitor and explicitly adjust execution parameters. Novices putted better under accuracy instructions. Experts were more accurate under speed instructions. In agreement with theories of skill acquisition and automaticity, novice performance is enhanced by conditions that allow for on-line attent...

Clear and unequivocal evidence shows that observation of object affordances or transitive actions facilitates the activation of a compatible response. By contrast, the evidence showing response facilitation following observation of intransitive actions is less conclusive because automatic imitation and spatial compatibility have been confounded. Three experiments tested whether observation of a finger movement (i.e., an intransitive action) in a choice reaction-time task facilitates the corresponding finger movement response because of imitation, a common spatial code, or some combination of both factors. The priming effects of a spatial and an imitative stimulus were tested in combination (Experiment 1), in opposition (Experiment 2), and independently (Experiment 3). Contrary to previous findings, the evidence revealed significant contributions from both automatic imitation and spatial compatibility, but the priming effects from an automatic tendency to imitate declined significantly across a block of trials whereas the effects of spatial compatibility remained constant or increased slightly. These differential effects suggest that priming associated with automatic imitation is mediated by a different regime than priming associated with spatial compatibility.

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A hypothesized five-stage developmental sequence of self-recognition behaviors was tested in 48 infants between 6 and 24 months of age, and the self-recognition sequence was compared to the development of object permanence. The predicted self-recognition sequence consisted of five tasks that the infants performed in front of the mirror, with later-developing tasks requiring the coordination of a larger number of behaviors relating to the infant's mirror image than earlier-developing tasks. The development of object permanence was assessed with the Uzgiris-Hunt scale, and the object-permanence items were assigned to stages that structurally paralleled the five stages of self-recognition. The self-recognition tasks formed an almost perfect Guttman scale, with 46 out of 48 infants fitting the predicted developmental sequence precisely. This finding thus resolves most of the disagreements in previous research on the development of self-recognition: Previous studies examined different behaviors, which develop at distinct stages in the sequence. Object permanence and self-recognition showed a strong correlation, but there was no consistent relationship between the two skills across age groups.One event of major significance in the development of the child is the emergence of a notion of self. Research on the emergence of the self has been sparse, however, probably because of the difficulty of specifying the behaviors that reflect the early development of the self. The few existing studies have usually focused on one particular situation: the reaction of an infant to his own image in a mirror. This situation appears to be ideal for assessing at least one aspect of the development of the notion of self, the development of self-recognition.Yet the study of self-recognition has This research was supported by a grant from the Grant Foundation and National institute of Mental Health Predoctoral Fellowship 1 F31 MHO5280-01 to the first author and a grant from the Spencer Foundation to the second author. Portions of this article were previously presented at the 47th Annual Meeting of the Eastern Psychological Association, New York City, April 1976.The authors wish to thank Scott Barron, Paul Corbitt, and Margot Gellman for their assistance in running infants and scoring data. Special thanks are extended to Joseph Campos for many helpful suggestions throughout the entire course of this study.Requests for reprints should be sent to Bennett Ber-.tenthal, Department of Psychology, University of Denver, Denver, Colorado 80208.proven to be more complex than one might expect. The research literature is full of confusions and contradictions, mostly arising from differences in the behavioral definitions of self-recognition. Infants show many different behaviors in front of a mirror, and different investigators have chosen different behaviors as indicative of true selfrecognition (Amsterdam, 1972;Boulanger-Balleyguier, 1964; Darwin, 1877;Dixon, 1957;Gallup, 1970; Stutsman, 1931;Zazzo, 1975; Brooks-Gunn& Lewis, Note 1). Consequently, in...