The capacity to build nuclear weapons—known as “nuclear latency”—is widely believed to be important in world politics. Yet scholarly research on this topic remains limited. This paper introduces a new dataset on nuclear latency from 1939 to 2012. It discusses coding procedures, describes global trends, and compares the dataset with earlier efforts to measure nuclear latency. We show that nuclear latency is far more common than nuclear proliferation: 31 countries developed the capacity to build nuclear bombs from 1939 to 2012, and only 10 of those states went on to acquire atomic arsenals. This paper provides one empirical application of the dataset, showing how the study of nuclear latency can contribute to our understanding of international conflict. We provide preliminary evidence that nuclear latency reduces the likelihood of being targeted in militarized disputes. Having the capacity to build nuclear weapons, therefore, may provide deterrence benefits that we usually associate with possessing a nuclear arsenal.

The ability of a government to prevent violence and threats against the state and its citizens depends on the government’s ability to deter enemies from engaging in such tactics. Because deterrence relies on both capabilities and credibility it is not clear that governments that emerge within the same state are similarly effective at deterring attacks. We examine whether partisan politics and the decision to use force against an enemy or those thought to be associated with an enemy—in our case terrorists—affects successful deterrence. We test our expectations using data from the Israeli-Palestine conflict between the years 1979 and 2003. The results suggest that governments of the right are more effective at using force to deter future terrorist attacks.

Conflict environments exacerbate an incentive dilemma between employers and private military and security companies (PMSCs). PMSCs seek to maximize profits, but employers seek to minimize expenses and maximize services. We argue that PMSCs are influenced by two complementary economic factors: contract structure and intra-sector competition. Contract structures are set by employers and establish compensation constraints and intra-sector competition identifies potential replacements. Both impact service delivery. We find that PMSCs with contract structures that lack performance incentives, even in the presence of competition, increase the likelihood of violence in Iraq. PMSCs that lacked intra-sector competition had a similar but smaller effect.

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An enduring challenge of public administration research is examining whether public management affects the delivery of public policy results. This study extends managerial influence to include public policy delivery in an active conflict environment. Individual manager training is critical in conflict environments because limited bureaucratic capacity and general environmental confusion are common. Organizations under stress use substitute managers. We argue that substitute managers' effectiveness is conditioned by two factors: managerial capability and networking capability. We examine substitute managers in a unique context, the US–Iraq War. Managers coordinated private military and security companies (PMSCs) to provide coalition forces and the civilian population with multiple services. We argue that managers with prior management experience and network capability are more effective substitute managers. The results suggest that managers with prior experience and networking capability are associated with decreases in civilian casualties. The results provide important policy insights into public management and defence policy.