Background The COVID-19 pandemic has increased online purchases and heightened interest in existing treatments. Dexamethasone, hydroxychloroquine, and lopinavir-ritonavir have been touted as potential COVID-19 treatments. Objective This study assessed the availability of 3 potential COVID-19 treatments online and evaluated the safety and marketing characteristics of websites selling these products during the pandemic. Methods A cross-sectional study was conducted in the months of June 2020 to August 2020, by searching the first 100 results on Google, Bing, and Yahoo! mimicking a US consumer. Unique websites were included if they sold targeted medicines, were in English, offered US shipping, and were free to access. Identified online pharmacies were categorized as rogue, unclassified, or legitimate based on LegitScript classifications. Patient safety characteristics, marketing techniques, price, legitimacy, IP addresses, and COVID-19 mentions were recorded. Results We found 117 websites: 30 selling dexamethasone (19/30, 63% rogue), 39 selling hydroxychloroquine (22/39, 56% rogue), and 48 selling lopinavir-ritonavir (33/48, 69% rogue). This included 89 unique online pharmacies: 70% were rogue (n=62), 22% were unapproved (n=20), and 8% were considered legitimate (n=7). Prescriptions were not required among 100% (19/19), 61% (20/33), and 50% (11/22) of rogue websites selling dexamethasone, lopinavir-ritonavir, and hydroxychloroquine, respectively. Overall, only 32% (24/74) of rogue websites required prescriptions to buy these medications compared with 94% (31/33) of unapproved and 100% (10/10) of legitimate websites (P<.001). Rogue sites rarely offered pharmacist counseling (1/33, 3% for lopinavir-ritonavir to 2/22, 9% for hydroxychloroquine). Drug warnings were unavailable in 86% (6/7) of unapproved dexamethasone sites. It was difficult to distinguish between rogue, unapproved, and legitimate online pharmacies solely based on website marketing characteristics. Illegitimate pharmacies were more likely to offer bulk discounts and claim price discounts, yet dexamethasone and hydroxychloroquine were more expensive online. An inexpensive generic version of lopinavir-ritonavir that is not authorized for use in the United States was available online offering US shipping. Some websites claimed hydroxychloroquine and lopinavir-ritonavir were effective COVID-19 treatments despite lack of scientific evidence. In comparing IP addresses to locations claimed on the websites, only 8.5% (7/82) matched their claimed locations. Conclusions The lack of safety measures by illegitimate online pharmacies endanger patients, facilitating access to medications without appropriate oversight by health care providers to monitor clinical response, drug interactions, and adverse effects. We demonstrated how easy it is to go online to buy medications that are touted to treat COVID-19 even when current clinical evidence does not support their use for self-treatment. We documented that illegitimate online pharmacies sidestep prescription requirements, skirt pharmacist counseling, and make false claims regarding efficacy for COVID-19 treatment. Health care professionals must urgently educate the public of the dangers of purchasing drugs from illegitimate websites and highlight the importance of seeking treatment through authentic avenues of care.

Objectives: Adderall (amphetamine-dextroamphetamine) is a controlled substance with harmful adverse effects if abused or misused. We assessed the availability of Adderall from common search engines, and evaluated the safety and marketing characteristics of online pharmacies selling Adderall. Design: Cross-sectional study. Setting and participants: From December 2019 to February 2020, the phrase "buy Adderall online" was queried in four search engines: Google (N ¼ 100), Bing (N ¼ 100), Yahoo (N ¼ 50) and DuckDuckGo (N ¼ 50). Online pharmacies that claimed to sell Adderall and had unique Uniform Resource Locators, were active, free-access, and in English language were included. Outcome measures: Online pharmacies were categorized as rogue, unclassified, or legitimate on the basis of LegitScript classifications. Safety and marketing characteristics, and costs were collected. Results: Of the 62 online pharmacies found to sell Adderall, 61 were rogue or unclassified. Across all rogue and unclassified online pharmacies, prescriptions were not required (100%), pharmacist services were not offered (100%), and quantity limits were not placed on the number of Adderall purchases (100%). Rogue and unclassified online pharmacies appealed to cost, offering price discounts (61%), bulk discounts (67%), and coupon codes (70%). Contrary to their claims, cheaper prices were available for all formulations and dosages of Adderall from GoodRx than from these online pharmacies. Rogue and unclassified online pharmacies promoted and enabled the illicit purchase of Adderall, appealing to privacy (74%), offering purchase through cryptocurrency (74%), and claiming registration or accreditation of their sites (33%). Conclusion: Rogue online pharmacies are pervasive in search engine results, enabling the illicit purchase of Adderall without a prescription. Consumers are at risk of purchasing Adderall, a medication with high abuse potential, from unsafe sources. Law enforcement, regulatory agencies, and search engines should work to further protect consumers from unregistered and illegitimate online pharmacies selling Adderall.

Background There is much public debate regarding the high cost of insulin. With 1-in-4 patients in the United States with type 1 diabetes reporting difficulties affording insulin, there is concern that some of these patients might look for cost savings on the internet, unaware that 96% of internet pharmacies are illegitimate. Patients who purchase insulin from illegitimate internet pharmacies remove themselves from traditional health care systems that ensure safe, quality-assured, and effective medication use. Objective This study aims to determine the accessibility of Humalog and NovoLog insulin from internet pharmacies and characterize how these sites approached patient safety, and priced as well as marketed their products. Methods From September to December 2019, we queried the phrases buy insulin online, buy Humalog online, and buy NovoLog online in common search engines. The first 100 search results from Google and Bing, and the first 50 search results from Yahoo! and DuckDuckGo were screened. Websites were included if they claimed to sell Humalog or NovoLog insulin, were active, free access, in the English language, and had a unique URL. The legitimacy of websites was classified using LegitScript. Safety and marketing characteristics were compared across the legitimacy of internet pharmacies. Internet pharmacy prices were compared with the prices offered through brick-and-mortar pharmacies using GoodRx. Results We found that 59% (n=29) of the 49 internet pharmacies in our analysis were illegitimate, whereas only 14% (n=7) were legitimate and 27% (n=13) were unclassified. Across illegitimate internet pharmacies, Humalog and NovoLog insulin were 2 to 5 times cheaper as compared with both legitimate internet pharmacies and brick-and-mortar stores. Risks associated with the use of illegitimate internet pharmacies by American consumers were evident: 57% (8/14) did not require a prescription, 43% (6/14) did not display medication information or warnings, and only 21% (3/14) offered access to purported pharmacists. This included 9 rogue internet pharmacies that sold Humalog and NovoLog insulin within the United States, where 11% (1/9) required a prescription, 11% (1/9) placed quantity limits per purchase, and none offered pharmacist services. Rogue internet pharmacies often offered bulk discounts (11/18, 61%), assured privacy (14/18, 78%), and promoted other products alongside insulin (13/18, 72%). The marketing language of illegitimate internet pharmacies appealed more to quality, safety, and customer service as compared with legitimate sites. Conclusions The ease of access to low-cost insulin through illegitimate internet pharmacies calls for urgent attention. Illegitimate internet pharmacies place patients at risk of poor-quality medications and subpar pharmacy services, resulting in adverse events and poor diabetes control. A multifaceted approach is needed to close illegitimate internet pharmacies through legal and regulatory measures, develop better search engine filters, raise public awareness of the dangers of illegitimate internet pharmacies, and address the high costs of insulin.

BACKGROUND The COVID-19 pandemic has increased online purchases and heightened interest in existing treatments. Dexamethasone, hydroxychloroquine, and lopinavir-ritonavir have been touted as potential COVID-19 treatments. OBJECTIVE This study assessed the availability of 3 potential COVID-19 treatments online and evaluated the safety and marketing characteristics of websites selling these products during the pandemic. METHODS A cross-sectional study was conducted in the months of June 2020 to August 2020, by searching the first 100 results on Google, Bing, and Yahoo! mimicking a US consumer. Unique websites were included if they sold targeted medicines, were in English, offered US shipping, and were free to access. Identified online pharmacies were categorized as rogue, unclassified, or legitimate based on LegitScript classifications. Patient safety characteristics, marketing techniques, price, legitimacy, IP addresses, and COVID-19 mentions were recorded. RESULTS We found 117 websites: 30 selling dexamethasone (19/30, 63% rogue), 39 selling hydroxychloroquine (22/39, 56% rogue), and 48 selling lopinavir-ritonavir (33/48, 69% rogue). This included 89 unique online pharmacies: 70% were rogue (n=62), 22% were unapproved (n=20), and 8% were considered legitimate (n=7). Prescriptions were not required among 100% (19/19), 61% (20/33), and 50% (11/22) of rogue websites selling dexamethasone, lopinavir-ritonavir, and hydroxychloroquine, respectively. Overall, only 32% (24/74) of rogue websites required prescriptions to buy these medications compared with 94% (31/33) of unapproved and 100% (10/10) of legitimate websites (<i>P</i>&lt;.001). Rogue sites rarely offered pharmacist counseling (1/33, 3% for lopinavir-ritonavir to 2/22, 9% for hydroxychloroquine). Drug warnings were unavailable in 86% (6/7) of unapproved dexamethasone sites. It was difficult to distinguish between rogue, unapproved, and legitimate online pharmacies solely based on website marketing characteristics. Illegitimate pharmacies were more likely to offer bulk discounts and claim price discounts, yet dexamethasone and hydroxychloroquine were more expensive online. An inexpensive generic version of lopinavir-ritonavir that is not authorized for use in the United States was available online offering US shipping. Some websites claimed hydroxychloroquine and lopinavir-ritonavir were effective COVID-19 treatments despite lack of scientific evidence. In comparing IP addresses to locations claimed on the websites, only 8.5% (7/82) matched their claimed locations. CONCLUSIONS The lack of safety measures by illegitimate online pharmacies endanger patients, facilitating access to medications without appropriate oversight by health care providers to monitor clinical response, drug interactions, and adverse effects. We demonstrated how easy it is to go online to buy medications that are touted to treat COVID-19 even when current clinical evidence does not support their use for self-treatment. We documented that illegitimate online pharmacies sidestep prescription requirements, skirt pharmacist counseling, and make false claims regarding efficacy for COVID-19 treatment. Health care professionals must urgently educate the public of the dangers of purchasing drugs from illegitimate websites and highlight the importance of seeking treatment through authentic avenues of care.

BACKGROUND There is much public debate regarding the high cost of insulin. With 1-in-4 patients in the United States with type 1 diabetes reporting difficulties affording insulin, there is concern that some of these patients might look for cost savings on the internet, unaware that 96% of internet pharmacies are illegitimate. Patients who purchase insulin from illegitimate internet pharmacies remove themselves from traditional health care systems that ensure safe, quality-assured, and effective medication use. OBJECTIVE This study aims to determine the accessibility of Humalog and NovoLog insulin from internet pharmacies and characterize how these sites approached patient safety, and priced as well as marketed their products. METHODS From September to December 2019, we queried the phrases <i>buy insulin online, buy Humalog online</i>, and <i>buy NovoLog online</i> in common search engines. The first 100 search results from Google and Bing, and the first 50 search results from Yahoo! and DuckDuckGo were screened. Websites were included if they claimed to sell Humalog or NovoLog insulin, were active, free access, in the English language, and had a unique URL. The legitimacy of websites was classified using LegitScript. Safety and marketing characteristics were compared across the legitimacy of internet pharmacies. Internet pharmacy prices were compared with the prices offered through brick-and-mortar pharmacies using GoodRx. RESULTS We found that 59% (n=29) of the 49 internet pharmacies in our analysis were illegitimate, whereas only 14% (n=7) were legitimate and 27% (n=13) were unclassified. Across illegitimate internet pharmacies, Humalog and NovoLog insulin were 2 to 5 times cheaper as compared with both legitimate internet pharmacies and brick-and-mortar stores. Risks associated with the use of illegitimate internet pharmacies by American consumers were evident: 57% (8/14) did not require a prescription, 43% (6/14) did not display medication information or warnings, and only 21% (3/14) offered access to purported pharmacists. This included 9 rogue internet pharmacies that sold Humalog and NovoLog insulin within the United States, where 11% (1/9) required a prescription, 11% (1/9) placed quantity limits per purchase, and none offered pharmacist services. Rogue internet pharmacies often offered bulk discounts (11/18, 61%), assured privacy (14/18, 78%), and promoted other products alongside insulin (13/18, 72%). The marketing language of illegitimate internet pharmacies appealed more to quality, safety, and customer service as compared with legitimate sites. CONCLUSIONS The ease of access to low-cost insulin through illegitimate internet pharmacies calls for urgent attention. Illegitimate internet pharmacies place patients at risk of poor-quality medications and subpar pharmacy services, resulting in adverse events and poor diabetes control. A multifaceted approach is needed to close illegitimate internet pharmacies through legal and regulatory measures, develop better search engine filters, raise public awareness of the dangers of illegitimate internet pharmacies, and address the high costs of insulin.