This is the first empirical study to examine Congressional support of a new law that distributes antidumping duties to protected firms. Because the law produces a transparent measure of how much each firm was rewarded for its efforts to secure the bill's passage, it provides researchers with a unique opportunity to study the link between the expected financial returns to firms, campaign contributions, and Congressional behaviour. Our results indicate that campaign contributions from beneficiaries increased the likelihood that lawmakers would sponsor the law, while contributions from the law's beneficiaries increased with the rewards they expected to receive. JEL classification: F13, D72Les rendements de la chasse aux rentes : contributions aux campagnesélectorales, subventions aux entreprises, et l'Amendement Byrd. Ceci est la premièreétude empirique examinant le support par le Congrès américain d'une nouvelle loi qui distribue les droits anti-dumping collectés aux entreprises protégées. Parce que la loi produit une mesure transparente de la récompense verséeà une entreprise pour ses efforts de lobbying afin de s'assurer que la loi est mise en vigueur, cela permet aux chercheurs d'étudier le lien entre les rendements financiers anticipés pour les entreprises, leurs contributions aux campagnesélectorales, et les actions du Congrès. Les résultats indiquent que les contributions aux campagneś electorales en provenance des bénéficiaires potentiels accroissent la probabilité que les législateurs vont supporter la loi, et que les contributions en provenance des bénéficiaires de la loi s'accroissentà proportion que la taille de la récompense anticipée s'accroît.
The steel industry has been protected by a wide variety of trade policies, both tariff-and quotabased, over the past decades. This extensive heterogeneity in trade protection provides the opportunity to examine the well-established theoretical literature predicting nonequivalent effects of tariffs and quotas on domestic firms' market power. Robust to a variety of empirical specifications with U.S. Census data on the population of U.S. steel plants from 1967-2002, we find evidence for significant market power effects for binding quota-based protection, but not for tariff-based protection. There is only weak evidence that antidumping protection increases market power.
JEL Codes: F13, F23, L11
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.