Safeguards, China, and the Price of Steel

Liebman, Benjamin H.

doi:10.1007/s10290-006-0071-y

Cited by 31 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 9 publications

(8 reference statements)

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“…A reasonable interpretation of this asymmetric response of foreign versus domestic prices seems to be that AD protection forces the foreign price to align on the price of domestic products to close the price gap between foreign and domestic prices. Interestingly, also Liebman (2006) for the US fails to find a significant increase in U.S. steel prices after a safeguard was put in place by the US government. Liebman (2006) using disaggregated product-level monthly panel data for steel finds that U.S. prices were much more affected by business cycle conditions and industry rationalization than by the safeguard protection imposed on imports of steel from abroad.…”

Section: Iii22 Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Heterogeneous responses of firms to trade protection

Konings

Vandenbussche

2008

Journal of International Economics

112

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Heterogeneous Responses of Firms to Trade ProtectionThis paper uses EU firm-level panel data to estimate the effect of Antidumping (AD) protection on the productivity of EU domestic firms in import-competing industries. We find that firms with relatively low initial productivity -laggard firms -have productivity gains during AD protection, while firms with high initial productivity -frontier firms -experience productivity losses. While the productivity of the average firm is moderately improved during AD protection, productivity remains below that of firms never involved in AD cases, thus questioning the desirability of protection. Our empirical results are consistent with recent theoretical work supporting the view that trade policy can have a differential effect on firms depending on their initial productivity.JEL Classification: 030, C2, F13 and L41

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Section: Iii22 Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Heterogeneous responses of firms to trade protection

Konings

Vandenbussche

2008

Journal of International Economics

112

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“…In principle this clause prevents the EU from imposing AD protection if consumer interests -in the form of rising prices -would be hurt by it. 13 Interestingly Liebman (2006) for the US, using disaggregated product-level monthly panel data for steel, also fails to finds a significant increase in U.S. steel prices after a safeguard was put in place by the US government but concludes that prices were more affected by business cycle conditions and industry rationalization than by the safeguard protection.…”

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confidence: 99%

Antidumping Protection Hurts Exporters: Firm-Level Evidence from France

Konings

Vandenbussche

2009

SSRN Journal

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Antidumping Protection hurts Exporters: Firm-level evidence from France* This paper empirically evaluates the effects of antidumping measures on the exports of protected firms. While antidumping protection raises the domestic sales of the more "traditional" non-exporting firms on the protected market with about 5%, it negatively affects the firm-level exports of similar products as the protected ones. Export sales of protected firms fall by almost 8% compared to a relevant control group of unprotected firms. The drop in firm-level exports more than doubles for firms that are global, i.e. firms with foreign affiliates. Measured at the product-level, extra-EU exports of goods protected by antidumping fall by 36% while exports to target countries fall by as much as 66% following protection. Protection also affects the extensive margin of exporters but to a lesser extent. Initial exporters face a marginally higher probability to stop exporting during protection compared to unprotected firms. Finally, we find that the productivity of exporters falls while that of nonexporters rises during antidumping protection. We offer a number of plausible explanations for our findings arising from the heterogeneous firm literature. We also discuss the importance of our findings for policy.JEL Classification: C2 and F13

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“…These strategies can range from having own selling point (for localized markets) to opening up several branches (for firms serving different markets). Other strategies identified by literature include; collusive behavior to maximize market share, selling differentiated products in several markets and thus charging different prices, running a low cost structure which enables a firm to increase profits by reducing prices and expanding market share (Liebman, 2006;Byaruhanga, 2002). …”

Section: Advertising and Performance Of Industrymentioning

confidence: 99%