An often implicit assumption of perceptual deterrence tests is that the elicited values pertaining to arrest risk reflect stable underlying beliefs. But researchers in other disciplines have found that reported expectations are highly susceptible to exogenous factors (e.g., anchors and question ordering), indicating that such values are somewhat arbitrary responses to probabilistic questions. At the same time, reported expectations are coherent within persons, such that respondents rank order them rationally. For deterrence, then, absolute values reported on arrest risks are likely not stable but individuals still rank order specific crimes in meaningful ways. We examine the interpretability of reported arrest risk for three possibilities: 1) Reported risks are stable probabilistic values; 2) reported risks are arbitrary and uninformative for deterrence research; or 3) reported risks display “coherent arbitrariness” with unstable values between individuals but stable rank ordering of crimes within individuals. Through the use of three random experiments of college students, our results indicate that elicited risk perceptions are arbitrary in that they are influenced by the presentation of anchors and question ordering. Nevertheless, the rank ordering of crimes within and across conditions is unaffected by the presentation of anchors, suggesting that reported risks are locally coherent within persons.

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In prior tests of Beckerian rational choice theory, the notion that individuals are responsive to the (dis)incentives associated with crime has been supported. Much of this research has comprised composite scores of perceived rewards and risks of multiple, often disparate, crime types that are then used to predict “general” offending behavior. Although the results of such prior tests are informative, we believe that this tendency has resulted in two shortcomings. First, a central component of mathematical rational choice theory is overlooked, namely, that responsivity to incentives will be crime specific. That is, offenders should prefer crime types that subjectively offer greater rewards and fewer risks relative to other crimes. Second, individual differences in offending specialization are not addressed, of which Clarke and Cornish (1985) and Shover (1996) argued rational choice theories are well suited to explain. Using a sample of serious offenders, we find that in a given time period, individuals are more likely to engage in crime types they viewed as more intrinsically rewarding and less risky compared with other crimes. Furthermore, individuals displayed greater specialization in violence to the extent they view violence as more rewarding and less risky than property offenses

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