Given that the ability to attend to a task without distraction underlies performance in a wide variety of contexts, training one's ability to stay on task should result in a similarly broad enhancement of performance. In a randomized controlled investigation, we examined whether a 2-week mindfulness-training course would decrease mind wandering and improve cognitive performance. Mindfulness training improved both GRE reading-comprehension scores and working memory capacity while simultaneously reducing the occurrence of distracting thoughts during completion of the GRE and the measure of working memory. Improvements in performance following mindfulness training were mediated by reduced mind wandering among participants who were prone to distraction at pretesting. Our results suggest that cultivating mindfulness is an effective and efficient technique for improving cognitive function, with wide-reaching consequences.

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Consciousness never fades during wake. However, if awakened from sleep, sometimes we report dreams and sometimes no experiences. Traditionally, dreaming has been identified with REM sleep, characterized by a wake-like, globally ‘activated’, high-frequency EEG. However, dreaming also occurs in NREM sleep, characterized by prominent low-frequency activity. This challenges our understanding of the neural correlates of conscious experiences in sleep. Using high-density EEG, we contrasted the presence and absence of dreaming within NREM and REM sleep. In both NREM and REM sleep, reports of dream experience were associated with a local decrease in low-frequency activity in posterior cortical regions. High-frequency activity within these regions correlated with specific dream contents. Monitoring this posterior ‘hot zone’ predicted whether an individual reported dreaming or the absence of experiences during NREM sleep in real time, suggesting that it may constitute a core correlate of conscious experiences in sleep.

Convergent evidence indicates that frontopolar Brodmann area 10, and more generally the anterior prefrontal cortex (aPFC), supports the human capacity to monitor and reflect on cognition and experience. An important unanswered question, however, is whether aPFC is a homogeneous region that supports a general-purpose metacognitive ability or whether there could be regional specialization within aPFC with respect to specific types of metacognitive processes. Previous studies suggest that the lateral and medial subdivisions within aPFC may support metacognitive judgments of moment-to-moment perceptual processes and assessments of information from memory stored over longer time scales, respectively. Here we directly compared intraindividual variability in metacognitive capacity for perceptual decisions and memorial judgments andusedresting-statefunctionalconnectivity(rs-fcMRI)torelatethisvariabilitytotheconnectivityofthemedialandlateralregionsofaPFC.We found a behavioral dissociation in metacognitive ability for perceptual and memorial judgments. Furthermore, functional connectivity analysis revealed distinct patterns of connectivity that correlated with individual differences in each domain. Metacognitive ability for perceptual decisions was associated with greater connectivity between lateral regions of aPFC and right dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, bilateral putamen, right caudate, and thalamus, whereas metacognitive ability for memory retrieval predicted greater connectivity between medial aPFC and the right central precuneus and intraparietal sulcus/inferior parietal lobule. Together, these results suggest that an individual's capacity for accurate introspection in the domains of perception and memory is related to the functional integrity of unique neural networks anchored in the medial and lateral regions of the aPFC.

Although anecdotes that creative thoughts often arise when one is engaged in an unrelated train of thought date back thousands of years, empirical research has not yet investigated this potentially critical source of inspiration. We used an incubation paradigm to assess whether performance on validated creativity problems (the Unusual Uses Task, or UUT) can be facilitated by engaging in either a demanding task or an undemanding task that maximizes mind wandering. Compared with engaging in a demanding task, rest, or no break, engaging in an undemanding task during an incubation period led to substantial improvements in performance on previously encountered problems. Critically, the context that improved performance after the incubation period was associated with higher levels of mind wandering but not with a greater number of explicitly directed thoughts about the UUT. These data suggest that engaging in simple external tasks that allow the mind to wander may facilitate creative problem solving.

Tests of working memory capacity (WMC) and fluid intelligence (gF) are thought to capture variability in a crucial cognitive capacity that is broadly predictive of success, yet pinpointing the exact nature of this capacity is an area of ongoing controversy. We propose that mind-wandering is associated with performance on tests of WMC and gF, thereby partially explaining both the reliable correlations between these tests and their broad predictive utility. Existing evidence indicates that both WMC and gF are correlated with performance on tasks of attention, yet more decisive evidence requires an assessment of the role of attention and, in particular, mind-wandering during performance of these tests. Four studies employing complementary methodological designs embedded thought sampling into tests of general aptitude and determined that mind-wandering was consistently associated with worse performance on these measures. Collectively, these studies implicate the capacity to avoid mind-wandering during demanding tasks as a potentially important source of success on measures of general aptitude, while also raising important questions about whether the previously documented relationship between WMC and mind-wandering can be exclusively attributed to executive failures preceding mind-wandering (McVay & Kane, 2010b).

2Consciousness never fades during wake. However, if awakened from sleep, sometimes we report dreams and sometimes no experiences. Traditionally, dreaming has been identified with REM sleep, characterized by a wake-like, globally 'activated', high-frequency EEG. However, dreaming also occurs in NREM sleep, characterized by prominent low-frequency activity. This challenges our understanding of the neural correlates of conscious experiences in sleep. Using high-density EEG, we contrasted the presence and absence of dreaming within NREM and REM sleep. In both NREM and REM sleep, the presence of dreaming was associated with a local decrease in low-frequency activity in posterior cortical regions. High-frequency activity within these regions correlated with specific dream contents. Monitoring this posterior 'hot zone' predicted the presence/absence of dreaming during NREM sleep in real time, suggesting that it may constitute a core correlate of conscious experiences in sleep.All rights reserved. No reuse allowed without permission.(which was not peer-reviewed) is the author/funder, who has granted bioRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity.The copyright holder for this preprint . http://dx.doi.org/10.1101/012443 doi: bioRxiv preprint first posted online Dec. 30, 2014; 3 An ongoing stream of experiences accompanies every waking moment. Sleep is the only time in which consciousness fades under normal physiological conditions: subjects awakened from sleep, especially early in the night, report that they were not experiencing anything up to 30% of the time 1 . At other times, subjects awakened from sleep report dreams -a stream of vivid experiences that occur despite being immobile, unresponsive, and largely disconnected from the environment. Thus, unlike wakefulness, sleep can be associated with either the presence or absence of conscious experiences. In addition, experiences in dreams can assume many forms, ranging from pure perceptual experiences to pure thought, from simple images to temporally unfolding narratives, which are often similar to awake conscious states but at times can be different in interesting ways 2,3 .The discovery of rapid eye movement (REM) sleep -the 'third state of being' besides wake and non-REM (NREM) sleep -led initially to a straightforward view of the neural correlates of dreaming 4 : the wake-like, high-frequency, 'activated' EEG 5,6 of REM sleep was thought to be associated with the presence of dream experiences, and the lowfrequency activity of NREM sleep with the absence of dreaming. However, later studies showed that up to 70% of NREM sleep awakenings yield reports of dream experiences 1 .Conversely, in a small but consistent minority of cases, subjects deny having had any experience when awakened from REM sleep. Thus, whether one experiences something or not during sleep cannot be determined simply by assessing one's behavioral state based on traditional EEG features or neuroimaging correlates 7,8 .The paradoxical occurrence of both the presence and absence of experien...

Abstract■ The mind flows in a "stream of consciousness," which often neglects immediate sensory input in favor of focusing on intrinsic, self-generated thoughts or images. Although considerable research has documented the disruptive influences of taskunrelated thought for perceptual processing and task performance, the brain dynamics associated with these phenomena are not well understood. Here we investigate the possibility, suggested by several convergent lines of research, that taskunrelated thought is associated with a reduction in the trial-totrial phase consistency of the oscillatory neural signal in response to perceptual input. Using an experience sampling paradigm coupled with continuous high-density electroencephalography, we observed that task-unrelated thought was associated with a reduction of the P1 ERP, replicating prior observations that mind-wandering is accompanied by a reduction of the brainevoked response to sensory input. Time-frequency analysis of the oscillatory neural response revealed a decrease in theta-band cortical phase-locking, which peaked over parietal scalp regions. Furthermore, we observed that task-unrelated thought impacted the oscillatory mode of the brain during the initiation of a task-relevant action, such that more cortical processing was required to meet task demands. Together, these findings document that the attenuation of perceptual processing that occurs during task-unrelated thought is associated with a reduction in the temporal fidelity with which the brain responds to a stimulus and suggest that increased neural processing may be required to recouple attention to a task. More generally, these data provide novel confirmatory evidence for the mechanisms through which attentional states facilitate the neural processing of sensory input. ■