We provide evidence that large‐scale government intervention in the use of self‐protective measures lowers crime. Since 1999, all new‐built homes in the Netherlands have to have burglary‐proof windows and doors. We find the regulatory change to have reduced burglary in new‐built homes from 1.1 to 0.8% annually, a reduction of 26%. Even though the regulation of built‐in security does not target preventative measures at homes that are most at risk, the social benefits of the regulation are likely to exceed the social costs.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Inspired by these findings, many cities around the world have adopted policies to quickly remove litter. While such policies may avoid that people follow the bad example of litterers, they may also invite free-riding on public cleaning services. We are the first to show that both forces are at play. We conduct a natural field experiment where, in a randomly assigned part of a residential area, the frequency of cleaning was drastically reduced during a threemonth period. We find evidence that some people start to clean up after themselves when public cleaning services are diminished. However, the tendency to litter more dominates. We also find evidence for persistency in these responses after the treatment has ended. Terms of use: Documents in JEL-codes: C93, H40, K42Keywords: littering, public services, free-riding, field experiment. Economics at Tilburg University, and the WZB Field Days in Berlin. We also thank seminar audiences at the University of Munich, Erasmus University Rottterdam, Stockholm University, and Tilburg University. Special thanks to the City of Rotterdam, the Charlois city district, and the community service providers Roteb and Stadstoezicht who made the field experiment possible. We are most grateful to Maya von Harras for providing daily project management, to Herman Coomans and Arthur Andjelic for collecting and processing the data, and to Peter van Dalen for his role in the early stages of the project. †

No abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The Engine Immobilizer: A Non-Starter for Car Thieves Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractWe provide evidence for a beneficial welfare impact of a crime policy that is targeted at strengthening victim precaution. Regulation made application of the electronic engine immobilizer, a simple and low-cost anti-theft device, mandatory for all new cars sold within the European Union as of 1998. We exploit the regulation as source of exogenous variation in use of the device by year of manufacture of cars. Based on detailed data at the level of car models, we find that uniform application of the security device reduced the probability of car theft by an estimated 50 percent on average in the Netherlands during 1995-2008, accounting for both the protective effect on cars with the device and the displacement effect on cars without the device. The costs per prevented theft equal some 1,500 Euro; a fraction of the social benefits of a prevented car theft. JEL-Code: K420, H110, H230.

Oil pollution is a serious issue in the Netherlands ever since merchant and military vessels with diesel engines gradually replaced vessels operating sails and steam engines in the early twentieth century. Arguably, the southern North Sea became one of the most heavily oil-polluted sea areas in the world as a result of chronic oil pollution. Major shipping incidents resulting in massive oil spills have, however, been rather rare within the area. In the early twenty-first century, the number of detected oil spills has markedly declined and levels of chronic oil pollution are currently rather low. Most detections of oil slicks are still concentrated around the major shipping lanes and off major ports such as Rotterdam and IJmuiden (leading to Amsterdam).