We analyse the tax/subsidy competition between two potential host governments to attract the plants of firms in a duopolistic industry. While competition between identical countries for a monopolist's investment is known to result in subsidy inflation, two firms can be taxed in equilibrium with the host countries appropriating the entire social surplus generated within the industry, despite explicit non‐cooperation between governments. Trade costs mean that the firms prefer dispersed to co‐located production, creating these taxation opportunities for the host countries. We determine the country‐size asymmetry that changes the nature of the equilibrium, inducing concentration of production in the larger country.
We examine a trade model where three countries compete for an exogenous number of firms. In our hub-and-spoke framework, one country is the hub through which all trade with and between spokes takes place. We establish the distribution of industrial activity in the absence of taxes and compare it to the equilibrium when countries compete to attract firms. Even when all countries are the same size, the centrality of the hub sets it apart. We determine how this trading pattern matters, comparing it to a structure with direct trade between all countries. The implications of international tax competition are also examined.
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