The worldwide spread of a new coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) since December 2019 has posed a severe threat to individuals’ well-being. While the world at large is waiting that the released vaccines immunize most citizens, public health experts suggest that, in the meantime, it is only through behavior change that the spread of COVID-19 can be controlled. Importantly, the required behaviors are aimed not only at safeguarding one’s own health. Instead, individuals are asked to adapt their behaviors to protect the community at large. This raises the question of which social concerns and moral principles make people willing to do so. We considered in 23 countries (N = 6948) individuals’ willingness to engage in prescribed and discretionary behaviors, as well as country-level and individual-level factors that might drive such behavioral intentions. Results from multilevel multiple regressions, with country as the nesting variable, showed that publicized number of infections were not significantly related to individual intentions to comply with the prescribed measures and intentions to engage in discretionary prosocial behaviors. Instead, psychological differences in terms of trust in government, citizens, and in particular toward science predicted individuals’ behavioral intentions across countries. The more people endorsed moral principles of fairness and care (vs. loyalty and authority), the more they were inclined to report trust in science, which, in turn, statistically predicted prescribed and discretionary behavioral intentions. Results have implications for the type of intervention and public communication strategies that should be most effective to induce the behavioral changes that are needed to control the COVID-19 outbreak.

We examined whether people who are prone to believe COVID‐19 conspiracy theories are characterised by an especially strong concern for others or an especially strong concern for the self, and whether these orientations are associated with willingness to take a COVID‐19 vaccine. We surveyed 4,245 participants from eight nations; three months later we re‐contacted 1,262 participants from three nations. Belief in COVID‐19 conspiracy theories was related to greater concerns about one’s own safety, and lower concerns about the safety of close others. Furthermore, conspiracist ideation at Wave 1 predicted reluctance to take a COVID‐19 vaccine at Wave 2, mediated through relative concern for self versus other. In sum, people who are high in conspiracy beliefs have relatively higher concern for the self relative to others, with troubling implications for public health.

Economic inequality has been found to have pernicious effects, reducing mental and physical health, decreasing societal cohesion, and fueling support for nativist parties and illiberal autocratic leaders. We start this review with an outline of what social identity theorizing offers to the study of inequality. We then articulate four hypotheses that can be derived from the social identity approach: the fit hypothesis, the wealth‐categorization hypothesis, the wealth‐stereotype hypothesis, and the sociostructural hypothesis. We review the empirical literature that tests these hypotheses by exploring the effect of economic inequality, measured objectively by metrics such as the Gini coefficient as well as subjectively in terms of perceptions of economic inequality, on wealth categorization (of others and the self), the desire for more wealth and status, intergroup hostility, attitudes towards immigrants, prosocial behavior, stereotyping, the wish for a strong leader, the endorsement of conspiracy theories, and collective action intentions. As we will show, this research suggests that economic inequality may have even more far‐reaching consequences than commonly believed. Indeed, investigating the effects of economic inequality on citizens' sociopolitical behaviors may be increasingly important in today's turbulent political and social landscape.

The present research demonstrates intergenerational influences on collective action participation, whereby parents’ past and current participation in collective action (descriptive family norms) shape their children’s participation in conventional and radical collective action via injunctive family norms (perception that parents value such participation). Two unique data sets were used: dyads of activist parents and their adult children (Study 1, N = 100 dyads) and student activists who participated in a yearlong, three-wave longitudinal study (Study 2, Ns wave 1 = 1,221, Wave 2 = 960, and Wave 3 = 917). Parents’ past and current participation directly and indirectly predicted children’s protest participation in Study 1, while Study 2 showed a similar pattern longitudinally: Perceptions of parents’ participation (descriptive family norm) and approval (injunctive family norm) predicted change in collective action participation over time. Together, results highlight family environment as a critical setting for the intergenerational transmission of protest.