How positive induced mood states affect reasoning was investigated in three experiments. In Experiment 1, consistent with resource allocation theory (H. C. Ellis & P. W. Ashbrook, 1987), both positive and negative mood suppressed performance on a deontic version of Wason's selection task (P. W. Cheng & K. J. Holyoak, 1985)-participants confirmed where they normally falsify. Experiment 2 revealed the same confirmatory responses for participants performing a concurrent distracter task, indicating that induced mood states suppress reasoning by depleting central executive resources. This hypothesis was directly tested in Experiment 3. Participants in a positive, but not in a negative, mood state showed suppressed performance on the Tower of London task (T. Shallice, 1982)-the classical central executive task. The robust positive mood effect and the confirmation effeel are discussed in terms of the D. A.

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The predictions of M. Oaksford and N. Chater's (1994) optimal data selection (ODS) model for the reduced array selection task (RAST) were tested in 4 experiments. Participants tested a hypothesis, ifp then q, by selecting cards showing q or not q instances. In Experiment 1, where selections were made from different sized stacks of q and not q cards, as P(q) increased, not q card selections rose, and q card selections fell, as predicted. Experiment 2 controlled for the possibility that stack height influenced responses; these results were also consistent with ODS. Experiment 3, which controlled further for this possibility, replicated Experiment 1. Experiment 4 addressed a final issue concerning the medium P(q) condition by concentrating on initial card selections; the results were again consistent with ODS. Although generally consistent with the ODS model, these experiments also suggest some interesting revisions. The psychology of reasoning appears to show that on some tasks people do not reason according to the rules of logic (e.g.,

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