The experimental investigation of decision-making in humans relies on two distinct types of paradigms, involving either description- or experience-based choices. In description-based paradigms, decision variables (i.e. payoffs and probabilities) are explicitly communicated by means of symbols. In experience-based paradigms decision variables are learnt from trial-by-trial feedback. In the decision-making literature, ‘description–experience gap’ refers to the fact that different biases are observed in the two experimental paradigms. Remarkably, well-documented biases of description-based choices, such as under-weighting of rare events and loss aversion, do not apply to experience-based decisions. Here, we argue that the description–experience gap represents a major challenge, not only to current decision theories, but also to the neuroeconomics research framework, which relies heavily on the translation of neurophysiological findings between human and non-human primate research. In fact, most non-human primate neurophysiological research relies on behavioural designs that share features of both description- and experience-based choices. As a consequence, it is unclear whether the neural mechanisms built from non-human primate electrophysiology should be linked to description-based or experience-based decision-making processes. The picture is further complicated by additional methodological gaps between human and non-human primate neuroscience research. After analysing these methodological challenges, we conclude proposing new lines of research to address them. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Existence and prevalence of economic behaviours among non-human primates’.
The experimental investigation of decision-making in humans relies on two distinct types of paradigms, involving either description- or experience-based choices. In description-based paradigms decision variables (i.e., payoffs and probabilities) are explicitly communicated by mean of symbols. In experience-based paradigms decision variables are learnt from trial-by-trial feedback. In the decision-making literature ‘description-experience gap’ refers to the fact that different biases are observed in the two experimental paradigms. Remarkably, well-documented biases of description-based choices, such as under-weighting of rare events and loss aversion, do not apply to experience-based decisions. Here we argue that the description-experience gap represents a major challenge, not only to current decision theories, but also to the neuroeconomics research framework, which reliesheavily on the translation of neurophysiological findings between human and non-human primate research. In fact, most non-human primate neurophysiological research relies on behavioural designs that share features of both description and experience-based choices. As a consequence, it is unclear whether the neural mechanisms discovered in non-human primate electrophysiology should be linked to description-based or experience-based decision-making processes. The picture is further complicated by additional methodological gaps between human and non-human primate neural research. After analysing these methodological challenges, we conclude proposing new lines of research to address them.
To choose between options of different natures, standard decision models presume that a single representational system ultimately indexes their subjective value on a common scale, regardless of how they are constructed. To challenge this assumption, we systematically investigated hybrid decisions between experiential options, whose value is built from past outcomes experience, and symbolic options which describe probabilistic outcomes. We show that participants' choices exhibited a pattern consistent with a systematic neglect of the experiential values. This normatively irrational decision strategy held after accounting for alternative explanations, and persisted when it bore an economics cost. Overall, our results demonstrate that experiential and symbolic values are not symmetrically considered in hybrid decisions, suggesting that they are not commensurable and recruit different representational systems which may be assigned different priority levels in the decision process. These ndings challenge the dominant models commonly used in value-based decision-making research.
Several micro-founded macroeconomic models with rational expectations address the issue of money emergence, by characterizing it as a coordination game. These models have in common the use of agents who dispose of perfect or near-perfect information on the global state of the economy and who display full-fledged computational abilities. Several experimental studies have shown that a simple trial-and-error learning process could constitute an explanation for how agents coordinate on a single mean of exchange. However, these studies provide subjects with full information regarding the state of the economy while restricting the number of goods in circulation to three. In this study, by the mean of multiagent simulations and human experiments, we test the hypothesis according to which coordination over a unique medium of exchange is possible in the context of information scarcity. In our experimental design, subjects and artificial agents are only aware of the outcome of their own decisions. We provide results for economies with 3 and 4 goods to evaluate to which extent it is possible to generalize results obtained with 3 goods to n goods. Our findings show that in an economy à la Iwai, commodity money can emerge under drastic information restrictions with three goods in circulation, but generalization to four or more goods is not guaranteed.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.
hi@scite.ai
10624 S. Eastern Ave., Ste. A-614
Henderson, NV 89052, USA
Copyright © 2024 scite LLC. All rights reserved.
Made with 💙 for researchers
Part of the Research Solutions Family.