The notion of accessibility of mental representations has been invaluable in explaining and predicting human thought and action. Focusing on social cognition, we review the large corpus of data that has accumulated since the first models of mental activation dynamics were outlined. We then outline a framework that we call Relevance of a Representation (or ROAR for short), the main tenant of which is that not all stimulated representations are in fact activated (i.e., influence thought and action processes). More specifically, we propose that the degree to which a representation is available to processes of thought and action is a function of that representation's motivational relevance. We end by demonstrating how the framework enables re-addressing the notions of accessibility, automaticity and selective attention.Is it nothing to you, all you who pass by?Lamentations 1:12When will something in our external environment affect our consequent judgment, thought and action? Over the last two decades in social psychology we have gathered substantial evidence showing that our thoughts and behaviors can change from exposure to meaningful stimuli even when we are not aware of them. But psychology still lacks a framework for explaining and predicting when this will happen . The goal of this paper is to propose such a framework.We begin by discussing three important concepts that are central to our framework-mental accessibility, activation, and applicability (for more general reviews of previous research regarding these principles, see

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Human motivation is sensitive to value-to the outcomes of actions. People invest mental and physical resources for obtaining desired results or for stopping and reversing undesired ones. Accordingly, people's motivation is sensitive to information about their standing in relation to outcome attainment ('outcome feedback'). In this paper, we argue and present the first evidence for the existence of another motivational sensitivity in humans-a sensitivity to our degree of control on the environment and hence to information about that control ('control feedback'). We show that when actions have even trivial and constant perceptual effects, participants' motivation to perform is enhanced. We then show that increased motivation is not because more information about task performance is available and that motivation is increased only in conditions in which control over the effects can be firmly established by the mind. We speculate on the implications for understanding motivation, and potentially, physical and mental health.

The sense of agency (SoA) is defined as “the registration that I am the initiator of my actions.” Both “direct” and “indirect” measurement of SoA has focused on specific contextualized perceptual events, however it has also been demonstrated that “higher level” cognitions seemingly affect the SoA. We designed a measure of person's general, context-free beliefs about having core agency—the Sense of Agency Scale (SoAS). An exploratory (EFA) and confirmatory (CFA) factor analyses on samples of 236 (Study 1) and 408 (Study 2) participants yielded two correlated factors we labeled Sense of Positive Agency (SoPA) and Sense of Negative Agency (SoNA). The construct validity of SoAS is demonstrated by its low-to-moderate correlations with conceptually relevant tools and by the moderate-strong relationship between the SoNA subscale and obsessive-compulsive (OC) symptoms (r = 0.35). We conclude that the SoAS seems to isolate people's general beliefs in their agency from their perceived success in obtaining outcomes.