BackgroundAnimal reservoirs of brucellosis constitute an ongoing threat to human health globally, with foodborne, occupational and recreational exposures creating opportunities for transmission. In Australia and the United States, hunting of feral pigs has been identified as the principal risk factor for human brucellosis due to Brucella suis. Following increased reports of canine B. suis infection, we undertook a review of case notification data and veterinary records to address knowledge gaps about transmission, clinical presentation, and zoonotic risks arising from infected dogs.ResultsBetween 2011 and 2015, there was a 17-fold increase in the number of cases identified (74 in total) in New South Wales, Australia. Spatial distribution of cases largely overlapped with high feral pig densities in the north of the state. Ninety per cent of dogs had participated directly in pig hunting; feeding of raw feral pig meat and cohabitation with cases in the same household were other putative modes of transmission. Dogs with confirmed brucellosis presented with reproductive tract signs (33 %), back pain (13 %) or lameness (10 %); sub-clinical infection was also common (40 %). Opportunities for dog-to-human transmission in household and occupational environments were identified, highlighting potential public health risks associated with canine B. suis infection.ConclusionsBrucellosis due to B. suis is an emerging disease of dogs in Australia. Veterinarians should consider this diagnosis in any dog that presents with reproductive tract signs, back pain or lameness, particularly if the dog has a history of feral pig exposure. Moreover, all people in close contact with these dogs such as hunters, household contacts and veterinary personnel should take precautions to prevent zoonotic transmission.

The ecology and distribution of B. anthracis in Australia is not well understood, despite the continued occurrence of anthrax outbreaks in the eastern states of the country. Efforts to estimate the spatial extent of the risk of disease have been limited to a qualitative definition of an anthrax belt extending from southeast Queensland through the centre of New South Wales and into northern Victoria. This definition of the anthrax belt does not consider the role of environmental conditions in the distribution of B. anthracis. Here, we used the genetic algorithm for rule-set prediction model system (GARP), historical anthrax outbreaks and environmental data to model the ecological niche of B. anthracis and predict its potential geographic distribution in Australia. Our models reveal the niche of B. anthracis in Australia is characterized by a narrow range of ecological conditions concentrated in two disjunct corridors. The most dominant corridor, used to redefine a new anthrax belt, parallels the Eastern Highlands and runs from north Victoria to central east Queensland through the centre of New South Wales. This study has redefined the anthrax belt in eastern Australia and provides insights about the ecological factors that limit the distribution of B. anthracis at the continental scale for Australia. The geographic distributions identified can help inform anthrax surveillance strategies by public and veterinary health agencies.

The epidemic highlights to horse owners and policy makers the potential for future outbreaks of arboviral diseases and the need for vigilance. It also highlights the complex interactions among hosts, vectors and climatic conditions that are required for such an outbreak to occur.

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A 300-sow farrow-to-finish herd in New South Wales was infected with influenza pandemic (H1N1) 2009 (H1N1/09) virus in July 2009 and became the first recorded case of influenza in pigs in Australia. The outbreak resulted from human-to-pig transmission. Clinical signs in affected pigs were mild compared with overseas reports of 'classical' swine influenza virus and included coughing and decreased appetite in a small proportion of non-lactating breeding stock, weaners, growers and finishers. A diagnosis of H1N1/09 influenza virus infection was confirmed using a combination of serology (haemagglutination inhibition, blocking enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay) and real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction. Attempts at virus isolation were unsuccessful. Results of a longitudinal study of pigs on this farm suggested that the virus continued to circulate for 9 weeks after the onset of infection, but was not present 6 months later. This report highlights the difficulties in preventing transmission of H1N1/09 influenza virus from infected humans to pigs during a human pandemic.

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Hendra virus is a highly pathogenic novel paramyxovirus causing sporadic fatal infection in horses and humans in Australia. Species of fruit-bats (genus Pteropus), commonly known as flying-foxes, are the natural host of the virus. We undertook a survey of horse owners in the states of Queensland and New South Wales, Australia to assess the level of adoption of recommended risk management strategies and to identify impediments to adoption. Survey questionnaires were completed by 1431 respondents from the target states, and from a spectrum of industry sectors. Hendra virus knowledge varied with sector, but was generally limited, with only 13% of respondents rating their level of knowledge as high or very high. The majority of respondents (63%) had seen their state’s Hendra virus information for horse owners, and a similar proportion found the information useful. Fifty-six percent of respondents thought it moderately, very or extremely likely that a Hendra virus case could occur in their area, yet only 37% said they would consider Hendra virus if their horse was sick. Only 13% of respondents stabled their horses overnight, although another 24% said it would be easy or very easy to do so, but hadn’t done so. Only 13% and 15% of respondents respectively had horse feed bins and water points under solid cover. Responses varied significantly with state, likely reflecting different Hendra virus history. The survey identified inconsistent awareness and/or adoption of available knowledge, confusion in relation to Hendra virus risk perception, with both over-and under-estimation of true risk, and lag in the uptake of recommended risk minimisation strategies, even when these were readily implementable. However, we also identified frustration and potential alienation by horse owners who found the recommended strategies impractical, onerous and prohibitively expensive. The insights gained from this survey have broader application to other complex risk-management scenarios.

This paper describes the level of adoption of biosecurity practices performed on Australian commercial chicken meat and layer farms and farmer-perceived importance of these practices. On-farm interviews were conducted on 25 free range layer farms, nine cage layer farms, nine barn layer farms, six free range meat chicken farms and 15 barn meat chicken farms in the Sydney basin bioregion and South East Queensland. There was a high level of treatment of drinking water across all farm types; town water was the most common source. In general, meat chicken farms had a higher level of adoption of biosecurity practices than layer farms. Cage layer farms had the shortest median distance between sheds (7.75m) and between sheds and waterbodies (30m). Equipment sharing between sheds was performed on 43% of free range meat chicken farms compared to 92% of free range layer farms. There was little disinfection of this shared equipment across all farm types. Footbaths and visitor recording books were used by the majority of farms for all farm types except cage layer farms (25%). Wild birds in sheds were most commonly reported in free range meat chicken farms (73%). Dogs and cats were kept across all farm types, from 56% of barn layer farms to 89% of cage layer farms, and they had access to the sheds in the majority (67%) of cage layer farms and on the range in some free range layer farms (44%). Most biosecurity practices were rated on average as ‘very important’ by farmers. A logistic regression analysis revealed that for most biosecurity practices, performing a practice was significantly associated with higher perceived farmer importance of that biosecurity practice. These findings help identify farm types and certain biosecurity practices with low adoption levels. This information can aid decision-making on efforts used to improve adoption levels.